

JFK's War

with the

National Security Establishment

Written and Presented by Douglas Horne

This Presentation Is “An Overview From 30,000 Feet”

- If Dr. John Newman’s presentation (“JFK and the Cold War: Deception, Treachery, and the Struggle for Power,” given on March 17, 2021) was a view from 10,000 feet, *my presentation attempts to be a grand overview of JFK’s struggles with the National Security State from an even higher altitude: this is a “big picture” presentation.*
- What matters today is “THE WHO” and “THE WHY.”
- Don’t remain forever focused upon events in Dealey Plaza, or even on the minutiae of the conflicts in the medical evidence:
 - Once you are convinced there was **a crossfire in Dealey Plaza** (and therefore a conspiracy); and once you are convinced that **the military autopsy was intentionally fraudulent**---all that really matters, going forward, is the **WHO**, and more importantly, the **WHY**, of JFK’s assassination.
 - It is natural to begin in Dealey Plaza and then move on to the many conflicts in the medical evidence, but you don’t want to stay there. *Only the big questions make this subject worthy of continuing study and interest.*

Origins of the National Security State (1 of 4)

[Recommended: JFK and the Unspeakable, by Jim Douglass]

- The **National Security Act of 1947** laid the foundations of a **national security state** by creating:
 - The National Security Council (NSC);
 - The Office of the Secretary of Defense;
 - The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); and
 - The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- The Key **National Security Council Directive NSC 10/2 of July 18, 1948** **Justified Numerous Future Abuses of Power:**
 - The U.S. intelligence community was authorized to carry out a broad range of **covert operations** (including propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, and subversion against hostile states---including assistance to underground resistance movements, and guerillas).
 - NSC 10/2 authorized violations of international law, and therefore **official lying as an indispensable cover** (“plausible deniability”); **plausible deniability** meant that such covert activities had to be *“so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons, and that if uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly deny any responsibility for them.”*
 - The policy of **plausible deniability** combined lying with hypocrisy.

Origins of the National Security State (2 of 4)


[Recommended: NSC-68, Forging the Strategy of Containment, published by the National Defense University at Fort McNair in 1994]

- **The Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic bomb (a small fission device) on August 29, 1949 (at least three years earlier than expected) meant the U.S. had lost its nuclear monopoly, and was the stimulus for NSC-68.**
- **On January 31, 1950, President Truman decided to proceed with development of the "super," which became known as the Hydrogen Bomb (a much more powerful thermonuclear weapon---a fusion device---as opposed to the primitive fission bombs dropped on Japan). In connection with this decision, he directed that the Secretaries of State and Defense reexamine U.S. objectives in peace and war, and our strategic plans, in view of the USSR's current atomic bomb capability and its likely ability to build a hydrogen bomb in the near future.**
- **The result was NSC-68. Paul Nitze, a "hawk" in the State Department, was its brainchild, with the strong support of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Issued on April 7, 1950, it called for a "**rapid and sustained buildup of political, economic, and military strength of the free world**," to counter the perceived intent by the USSR to dominate the world---a conclusion reached earlier on November 23, 1948 by NSC 20/4, and which was the underlying assumption behind the urgent need for a massive peacetime arms buildup, especially in nuclear weapons. In April of 1950, **NSC-68 reiterated the USSR's perceived intent to dominate the world, and called for a massive arms buildup during peacetime, before the Korean War began**, when defense expenditures were low (and when Truman was considering further defense cuts).**
- **NSC-68 declared that 1954 would be the year of maximum danger, when the USSR would have enough fission bombs to seriously damage the United States, and recommended rapid stockpiling of American nuclear weapons to counter this threat. [This gave birth to an overwhelming American nuclear superiority throughout the mid-to-late 1950s, and early 1960s---and the serious temptation to use it.]**
- President Truman was initially skeptical about NSC-68 and did not approve the basic text until September 30, 1950; but on December 16, 1950, after the completion of various NSC economic studies pertaining to the stockpiling of weapons and a permanently increased defense budget, he issued **Presidential Proclamation 2914, declaring a state of national emergency**, and calling upon the American people to make the necessary sacrifices to implement NSC-68's strategy of global containment of the Soviet Union, and counter what he called "**world conquest by Communist imperialism**," by funding massive and continuing increases in national defense.

Loss of America's Nuclear Monopoly in August of 1949 Led to Paranoia; A "War Economy" During Peacetime; and the Rapid Stockpiling of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, To Dangerous Levels


NSC-68 led to the obsessive stockpiling of nuclear weapons and delivery systems (long-range bombers and in-flight refueling tankers), *and one peril* of this overwhelming (and increasing) dominance during the mid-to-late 1950s *became the overwhelming temptation to use them, which* reached its culmination in 1961 and 1962.

Many of the conflicts between JFK and his national security establishment revolved around the cavalier attitude toward their use within the Pentagon, and among civilian "hawks." *That theme is endemic during Kennedy's Presidency.*



“Hawks” Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson Deliberately Exaggerated the Soviet Threat in NSC-68 to Justify Massive Increases in Defense Spending to Maintain U.S. Nuclear Superiority

Paul Nitze



Dean Acheson



Origins of the National Security State (3 of 4)

[Recommended: *Arsenals of Folly*, by Richard Rhodes]

- **Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson**, the two foremost State Department hawks, both engaged in “threat inflation” with regard to the USSR, according to historian Richard Rhodes.
 - **Dean Acheson later said: “The purpose of NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.”**
 - **Paul Nitze wanted** to sacrifice rationality in his analysis of the USSR in NSC-68, and to exaggerate the threat posed by the Soviet Union, so that the reaction of opinion leaders in the government would be commensurate with the exaggerated threat.
 - **Thus, the “bludgeon” that Acheson spoke of was Nitze’s intentional exaggeration of the Soviet threat. NSC-68 painted the USSR not only as a source of implacable evil, but greatly exaggerated the military threat posed by the USSR, which was a nation exhausted by World War II.**
- **After 1954, the “year of maximum danger” forecast by NSC-68, passed without any attack from the USSR, the fears of Soviet nuclear power were kept alive by the Gaither Committee**, a group of civilians appointed by President Eisenhower to study questions about building a massive civil defense system against nuclear attack. The Gaither Committee “went rogue,” and exceeded its mandate, by studying the issues considered by NSC-68 (thanks to committee member Paul Nitze). **The new “year of maximum danger” according to the Gaither Committee would be 1959; its November 7, 1957 report greatly exaggerated the threat posed by future Soviet ICBMs and heavy bombers**, but Eisenhower was unpersuaded. Its recommendations included:
 - Increasing American intermediate range nuclear missiles from the planned-for 60 to 240;
 - Increasing American ICBMs (Atlas and Titan) from the planned-for 80 to 600;
 - Increasing military spending by 50 per cent;
 - Building a massive civilian system of nuclear fallout shelters; and
 - Increasing the alert posture of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which already enjoyed an overwhelming advantage over the USSR in long-and-medium-range nuclear bombers.

The Gaither Report was followed immediately by widespread public fears of a “missile gap,” promoted by the U.S. Air Force and numerous journalists (which became an integral part of the 1960 Presidential campaign).

Origins of the National Security State (4 of 4)


[Recommended: *Countdown to Darkness*, by Dr. John Newman]

- **Meanwhile**, historian Jim Douglass writes that under **Allen Dulles** (appointed Deputy Director of the CIA in 1951 and Director of Central Intelligence in 1953), **the CIA interpreted NSC Directive 10/2 of July 18, 1948 and “plausible deniability” as a green light to overthrow governments, plan for the assassination of foreign leaders, and lie to cover-up any trace of accountability**---all for the sake of promoting U.S. interests in general, and more specifically, its “holy war” against Communism, which was perceived as bent on worldwide domination. Paranoia about the USSR had morphed into a *jihad* against any left-leaning governments; and any leader critical of (or even neutral toward) the U.S. (or its business interests) was viewed by the national security establishment as a “Communist threat.” **Two governments overthrown by the CIA under Dulles were:**
 - The democratically elected **Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953**; and
 - The democratically elected **President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, in 1954**.
- **Later, during his second term, Eisenhower ordered Dulles to arrange for the assassination of two heads of government: Patrice Lumumba** in the Congo and **Rafael Trujillo** in the Dominican Republic. [Source: John Newman’s *Countdown to Darkness*.] President Eisenhower felt this was necessary to get both NATO and Latin American support for the future U.S. assassination of the revolutionary new Cuban leader, **Fidel Castro**.
- Although Eisenhower opposed large conventional force buildups, and was not persuaded by the hysteria of the Gaither Report, he did believe in the policies espoused by NSC 10/2, and the “**plausible deniability**” doctrine; and he did endorse the “**massive nuclear retaliation**” doctrine of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the brother of the CIA Director.
- Under Eisenhower, **Dulles began planning for regime change in Cuba** by training anti-Castro guerillas for infiltration into Cuba; **this quickly morphed into a clandestine paramilitary invasion plan before Eisenhower left office in January of 1961** (which later became known as the “Bay of Pigs,” or BOP operation).

**Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
from 1953-1961**



JFK's Inaugural Address: **January 20, 1961** "The Torch Has Been Passed"



JFK's Inaugural Speech Was A Rhetorical Masterpiece

The inaugural address was NOT a belligerent speech, as some historians have claimed.

It was a well-balanced, carefully crafted appeal to reason that was both inspiring and uplifting, and full of idealism. Kennedy not only promised to fulfill his Cold War responsibilities, but emphasized the theme of sacrifice ("the torch has been passed...now the trumpet summons us again...ask not what your country can do for you---ask what you can do for your country"). It also expressed great concern about the dangers of the nuclear age and the importance of negotiations; JFK proposed two ways for the U.S. and USSR to cooperate with each other moving forward: arms control and space exploration.



JFK's Inaugural Address: A Set of Mixed Messages

Many Historians Have Falsely Labeled It a "Bellicose" Speech

- The speech was all about foreign policy, at the height of the Cold War; its major theme was the need for sacrifice by the American people.
- The one "hardline" statement in the speech was: *"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and success of liberty."*
 - *This was JFK's response to a bellicose speech Khrushchev had made on Jan 6th, and was his answer to those in the establishment who feared he would be an appeaser, as his father had been against Hitler, at the time of the Munich Pact in 1938---and afterwards, well into 1940, until Joseph P. Kennedy lost his job as Ambassador to Great Britain. Furthermore, JFK was replacing the revered General Eisenhower as President---the former Supreme Allied Commander in Western Europe during WWII---and wanted to reassure Americans that there would be a steady hand at the helm in military and foreign policy.*
- The theme of sacrifice was embodied in three noteworthy passages in the speech:
 - *"...the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans---born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage---and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world."*
 - *"Now the trumpet summons us again---not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need---not as a call to battle, though embattled we are---but as a call to bear the burden of a long, twilight struggle, year in and year out...a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."*
 - *"ASK NOT what your country can do for you---ask what you can do for your country."*

JFK's Inaugural Address (continued)

- The dangers of nuclear war were openly stressed by JFK in the speech:
 - *“The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of poverty and all forms of human life.”*
 - *“Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.”*
 - *“We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course---both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter the uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war. So let us begin anew---remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER FEAR TO NEGOTIATE.”*
- Kennedy proposed cooperation with the Soviet Union in these passages:
 - *“Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms---and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.”*
 - *“Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce.”*

**As You View this Presentation, Ask Yourself:
“What Were JFK’s Opponents Thinking About Him Each Step
Along the Way, As the Policy Debates on Cuba, Laos, Vietnam,
Berlin, and Nuclear Weapons Were Unfolding?”**



1961 Was A Year of Crisis for President Kennedy:

JFK Was Inexorably Pushed Toward War in Cuba and Southeast Asia, While the Confrontation with the USSR Over Berlin Threatened to “Go Nuclear”

- In the Bay of Pigs (BOP) crisis from April 17-20, 1961, JFK was himself the target of a covert operation designed to get him to commit U.S. combat troops to “bail out” an exile invasion which everyone in the CIA and Pentagon knew would fail on its own.
 - A “perfect failure,” the BOP operation became the **major fault line** defining JFK’s deteriorating relations with the national security establishment.
 - “Aftershocks” included a final “NO” decision by JFK on intervention in Laos; Operation *Northwoods* in 1962 (JCS pretexts for a U.S. invasion of Cuba), and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962.
- The JCS, the National Security Council, and hawks in the State Department all pushed JFK “to the brink” over Laos in March of 1961; after the BOP fiasco, JFK’s mistrust of the Pentagon military leadership and civilian hawks in government was very high, and Kennedy opted in late April of 1961---after the BOP disaster---**NOT to intervene with U.S. combat troops in Laos.**
- Immediately after his “no intervention” decision over Laos, the national security establishment pressured him continuously from May of 1961 through late November of 1961 to commit U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam.
- JFK successfully resisted calls for war in Cuba and Southeast Asia, and “held the line” in Berlin, in defense of NATO treaty obligations, in defense of the one place he believed was worth defending, by going to war if necessary.
 - But if Richard Nixon had been President, the United States would surely have found itself at war in both Cuba and in Southeast Asia, in 1961.

Bay of Pigs Overview (1 of 4)

[Recommended: Dr. John Newman's *Countdown to Darkness*]

- On March 17, 1960 President Eisenhower approved an NSC recommendation to overthrow the Castro regime; on August 18, 1960 he approved a dramatic expansion of that plan which now included a paramilitary invasion, and \$13 million in funding.
- On November 3, 1960 the Special Group, Augmented (of the NSC) admitted that the CIA's plan for a paramilitary invasion of Cuba, followed by a "spontaneous Cuban uprising," *could not succeed without the use of overt U.S. military force.* This group includes the Pentagon, the State Department, and the President's national security advisor.
- On November 15, 1960 an internal CIA meeting (of the Cuban Task Force) recognizes that not only will there be no spontaneous internal uprising to support the invasion, but that the concept of a 1,500-3,000 man paramilitary invasion to secure an airstrip would be UNACHIEVABLE except as a joint CIA/DOD action. *No part of this conclusion was shared with the President or President-elect.*
- Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of the CIA briefed President-elect Kennedy twice about the plan for a Cuban paramilitary invasion, on November 18 and 29, 1960. **During the second briefing, Bissell resurrected the fiction that the exile invasion would ignite a spontaneous Cuban uprising.** *This lie was clearly told to avoid having the new President consider cancelling the paramilitary invasion.* [Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans---covert operations---had been in charge of the U-2 surveillance program of the USSR, and was now in charge of the Cuban exile invasion, as well as assassination plots against Castro.]

Both Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell Lied to JFK, Saying There Would Be a Massive Cuban Uprising Against Castro, Concurrent with the Paramilitary Invasion by Cuban Exiles

DCI Allen Dulles Briefing JFK



DDP Richard Bissell



Bay of Pigs Overview (2 of 4)

- **Meanwhile, the CIA was attempting to assassinate Fidel Castro, and these plans for his elimination became an integral part of any future paramilitary plans to overthrow his regime:**
 - This was first suggested in a December 11, 1959 memo from J.C. King, Head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, sent to Allen Dulles and favorably endorsed by Richard Bissell; the memo encouraged Castro's "elimination" and "disappearance." **Dulles approved the memo after changing the word *elimination* to "removal from Cuba," and after changing the word *disappearance* to "removal."**
 - **In August of 1960 Richard Bissell began CIA attempts to recruit the American Mafia to assassinate Castro using Robert Maheu as a cutout.** [This led to one inept attempt after another for over two years.]
- After JFK's inaugural address on January 20th, **Chairman of the JCS Lyman Lemnitzer** declared at a meeting on January 22nd (at which President Kennedy was not present) that **Castro had an army of 32,000 men; a national police force of 9,000 men; and a national militia of 200,000 men;** and that the receipt by Cuba of more than 30,000 tons of arms and equipment from the Eastern Bloc in the past 6 months required "a decided change in the U.S. contingency plans to deal with it."
- **On two occasions---January 25 and 28, 1961---Lemnitzer gave JFK honest assessments that the paramilitary invasion could not succeed due to Castro's increased military strength,** and on January 28th asked "**who would come to their aid**" shortly after they landed on the beachhead? **JFK did not take the bait.** At this second meeting, Dulles admitted that the Pentagon's position was that ***no currently authorized course of action could succeed in overthrowing the Castro regime.***
- **On February 3, 1961, the whole game plan changed:** the JCS wrote a report for Secretary of Defense McNamara dishonestly saying that "**evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment,**" and further stated: "**Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not immediately achieve the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.**" [The Bay of Pigs post-mortem presided over by General Maxwell Taylor later revealed that **the phrase "fair chance of ultimate success" meant only a 30 per cent chance of success; this masterpiece of weasel-wording** was inserted by the head of the Joint Staff, General Earle Wheeler, who later became Army Chief of Staff under JFK, and later, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under LBJ.]
- In March 11, 1961 President Kennedy---in agreement with Dean Rusk---expressed discomfort with the original invasion site of Trinidad, saying that he preferred a less public location in an effort to maintain plausible deniability and mask U.S. involvement with the paramilitary invasion. **JFK later opted for a change to the Bay of Pigs location, but was never informed that General Gray on the Joint Staff estimated that the new invasion site reduced the chances of success to only 20 per cent (instead of 30 per cent at Trinidad).** Meanwhile, Secretary of State Dean Rusk became increasingly concerned about the "excessive" number of air strikes planned prior to the invasion by the Cuban exile air force, and began reducing the planned number of air strikes for the same reason JFK had changed the invasion site: *plausible deniability.*

Bay of Pigs Overview (3 of 4)

- **REALITIES:** An exile paramilitary invasion of about 1,400 men had no chance of success against a defending army of 32,000 men---supported by a militia of 200,000 men---all recently bolstered by large arms shipments from the Warsaw Pact. It is true that the number of air strikes were reduced, primarily by the State Department, and later by the President; but that is only an “asterisk to history” that did not change the overall chances of success or failure of the paramilitary invasion by Cuban exiles. The invading force was grossly insufficient to accomplish the objective, and the one sole factor upon which the invasion’s approval was predicated was the myth---**the BIG LIE**---of a “spontaneous public uprising” that would help topple Castro.
- **AS CASTRO BECAME AWARE OF THE IMPENDING EXILE INVASION** and began to publicly protest, **JFK went public and announced that no U.S. military forces would be used to invade Cuba.** He said this not only to maintain plausible deniability about the forthcoming exile invasion, but he meant it, as well: **President Kennedy made clear to his military and civilian subordinates during the months preceding the exile invasion that he would not under ANY circumstances send American military forces to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. Unfortunately, his military and CIA advisors did not believe that he meant it.**
- **ALLEN DULLES** wrote later in an unpublished article: **“We felt that when the chips were down---when the crisis arose in reality, any action required for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise to fail.”**
- This has caused **David Talbot** (in his book *The Devil’s Chessboard*) to conclude that **not only was the Bay of Pigs doomed to fail, but that it was designed to fail.**
- **After news analyst Daniel Schorr** attended a Bay of Pigs conference in Havana in March 2001, he concluded on National Public Radio that after the exile invaders had established a beachhead and publicly appealed for aid from the United States and the OAS, that the assumption was that **“President Kennedy, who had emphatically banned direct American involvement, would be forced by public opinion to come to the aid of the returning patriots. American forces, probably Marines, would come to expand the beachhead. IN EFFECT, PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS THE TARGET OF A CIA COVERT OPERATION THAT COLLAPSED WHEN THE INVASION COLLAPSED.”**

Bay of Pigs Overview (4 of 4)

- Dr. John Newman, perhaps, has summarized it better than anyone:

“President Kennedy had made it clear to his subordinates that he would not, under any circumstances, commit U.S. military forces to action in Cuba. Yet, Dulles and the Chiefs did not believe their commander-in-chief. They were certain that, once the exile brigade was pinned down and being slaughtered on the beachhead, Kennedy would have to give in. The Chiefs had lied about their professional position on the CIA plan. *It was a disgraceful, disloyal, and insubordinate performance.*”

- **Endgame:** Of the 1400 Cuban exile invaders, 114 were killed; 1,189 were captured; and about 100 were not accounted for, and were presumed to have escaped. About 1,250 of Castro’s forces were killed, and about 2,000 were wounded.
- **The debacle was a major international embarrassment for the United States.** U.S. foreign policy in its own hemisphere had suffered an egregious defeat due to poor planning, bungled execution, lousy intelligence that amounted to wishful thinking, and poor political judgment---**all exacerbated by a pattern of intentional lying to, and the withholding of key information from, the Chief Executive---in a brazen attempt to manipulate him into a course of action that everyone knew he did not endorse.**
This one event, over three months in the making, destroyed almost all trust between President Kennedy and his key CIA and Pentagon advisors at the very beginning of his administration.

Bay of Pigs Aftermath (1 of 2)

- JFK took full public responsibility for the fiasco, while refusing to discuss any of the details:
 - “I am the responsible officer of the government.”
 - “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.”
- But “JFK’s War with the National Security Establishment” was now on; Jim Douglass wrote that:
 - In a 1966 *New York Times* article, JFK was reported to have said shortly after the Bay of Pigs that he wanted to “splinter the CIA in[to] a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.”
 - JFK told aide Arthur Schlesinger: “It’s a hell of a way to learn things, but I have learned one thing from this business---that is, that we will have to deal with the CIA...no one else has dealt with the CIA.”
 - Schlesinger wrote that JFK quietly moved to cut the CIA’s budget in 1962 and 1963, aiming for a 20 per cent reduction by 1966.
 - JFK fired the three top-level CIA officials, in the following order:
 - Allen Dulles (the Director of Central Intelligence) was let go in November of 1961;
 - Lt. Gen. Charles Cabell, USAF (Deputy Director of the CIA) was let go in January of 1962; and
 - Richard Bissell (the Deputy Director for Plans) was finally let go in February of 1962.
- JFK asked his speechwriter and special counselor Ted Sorensen, “How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?”
- Presidential Aides Kenneth O’Donnell and Dave Powers wrote: “The absence of any preparations for an organized uprising in Cuba, and the assurances of [U.S.] military support given to the rebels in the landing force, led President Kennedy to a bitter conclusion: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA must have been assuming all along that the President would become so worried at the last minute about the loss of his own prestige that he would drop his restriction against the use of U.S. forces and send the Marines and the Navy jets into action. How else, the President asked us, could the Joint Chiefs approve such a plan? ‘They were sure I’d give in to them and send the go-ahead order to the [aircraft carrier] Essex,’ he said one day to Dave Powers. ‘They couldn’t believe that a new President like me wouldn’t panic and try to save his own face. Well, they had me figured all wrong.’ As General Douglas MacArthur remarked privately to the President, he was lucky to have learned so much about the value of his military advice from an operation like the Bay of Pigs disaster, where the strategic cost was so small.”

Two of the Three CIA Officials JFK Fired After the Bay of Pigs
Are Seen in this 1955 Photo: DCI Allen Dulles (far left) and DDCI Lt. Gen.
Charles Cabell (far right); USAF Colonel Ed Lansdale, a Dulles Protégé and a
Counterinsurgency “Expert,” is at center-left.



Bay of Pigs Aftermath (2 of 2)

[Recommended: *The Pleasure of His Company*, by Paul “Red” Fay]

- President Kennedy spoke frankly about the quality of the military advice he received during the Bay of Pigs to his former Navy PT-boat comrade, Paul Fay, who was now Under Secretary of the Navy:
 - **“Nobody is going to force me to do anything I don’t think is in the best interests of the country. I will never compromise the principles on which this country is built, but we’re not going to plunge into an irresponsible action just because a fanatical fringe in this country puts so-called national pride above national reason.** Do you think I’m going to carry on my conscience the responsibility for the wanton maiming and killing of children like our children we saw here this evening? Do you think I’m going to cause a nuclear exchange---for what? Because I was forced into doing something that I didn’t think was proper and right? Well, if you or anybody else thinks I am, he’s crazy. By God, there will be no avoiding responsibility nor will there be any irresponsibility. When the time for action comes, action will be taken.”
 - **“Looking back on that whole Cuban mess, one of the things that appalled me the most was the lack of broad judgment by some of the heads of the military services.** When you think of the long competitive selection process that they have to weather to end up the number one man of their particular service, it is certainly not unreasonable to expect that they would also be bright, with good broad judgment. **For years I’ve been looking at those rows of ribbons and those four stars, and conceding a certain higher qualification not obtained in civilian life. Well, if [Lemnitzer] and [Burke] are the best the services can produce, a lot more attention is going to be given to their advice in the future before any action is taken as a result of it. They wanted to fight and probably calculated that if we committed ourselves part way and started to lose, I would give the OK to pour in whatever was needed.** I found out among other things that when it comes to making decisions I want facts more than advice. As good old Harry Truman put it, ‘The buck stops right here.’ **I can see now why McNamara wants to get some new faces over there in the Pentagon.”**
- President Kennedy put CNO Arleigh Burke out to pasture on August 1, 1961. Lyman Lemnitzer, after another tempestuous year with JFK, especially in the spring of 1962, was finally replaced as Chairman of the JCS on October 1, 1962 (but unfortunately, instead of retiring him, JFK placed him in Europe as SACEUR, the military commander of all NATO forces).

JFK Severely Criticized Lyman Lemnitzer and Arleigh Burke to His Friend, Paul "Red" Fay

JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer



CNO Arleigh Burke



Meanwhile, An Unhappy **Allen Dulles** Would “Hang Around” Until Late November, 1961---*Waiting to be Fired*



JFK Says “NO” to Combat Troops in Laos

Immediately after the Bay of Pigs Fiasco (1 of 3)

[Recommended: *JFK and Vietnam, Second Edition*, by Dr. John Newman]

- Eisenhower warned JFK that he would have to introduce U.S. combat troops into Laos to save Southeast Asia; **but JFK had other plans: a diplomatic settlement leading to a coalition government---a “neutral” Laos.**
- Laos was the key to Vietcong infiltration into South Vietnam (and later, Cambodia).
- **On March 9, 1961 JFK authorized the use of Marine helicopters inside Laos for CIA-directed “White Star” U.S. Army special forces operations;** 300 Marines were sent to Thailand to support helicopter maintenance.
- After key “crisis meetings” on Laos March 21-22, **JFK publicly announced on March 23rd the repositioning of U.S. combat forces in the South China Sea (3 aircraft carriers) and Thailand (150 combat Marines); more U.S. Marines (2,600) were readied in Okinawa in the event they were needed for combat operations in Laos.**
 - JFK’s goal was to force the Communist side to the negotiating table in spite of their recent successes in Laos on the battlefield; real military moves were required for this.
 - **No final decision on intervention was made** while JFK waited for the Cuban exile invasion to unfold, and waited to find out whether the Communists in Laos would negotiate.
- In late March, the State Department recommended introducing 26,000 troops (half American, half Asian); the NSC position (Walt Rostow) was that a small blocking force should be placed in South Vietnam; **but the Joint Chiefs’ position, according to Rostow, was “all or nothing; either go in on a large scale, with 60,000 soldiers, air cover, and even nuclear weapons, or else stay out.”** *The JCS were opposing limited intervention.*
- **POST BAY of PIGS:** Moscow agreed to a cease fire (prior to negotiations) on April 24th, but the response of the Pathet Lao Communist forces in Laos was an all-out offensive to grab as much territory as they could, before a cease fire was implemented; this created a new foreign policy crisis in Washington.
- A series of crisis Cabinet meetings and NSC meetings were held between April 26 and May 2, 1961.

JFK Says “NO” to Combat Troops in Laos (2 of 3)

- April 27, 1961 was a day of prolonged crisis meetings on Laos; the JCS made “incoherent” and widely differing recommendations---there was no unanimity among the Chiefs. **Walt Rostow (NSC) said, “I never saw a worse performance by our military,” and told Schlesinger it was the worst White House meeting of the entire Kennedy presidency.**
- **Highlights of the April 27th meeting:**
 - **CNO Arleigh Burke argued the U.S. would either lose Southeast Asia without a war, or have to fight a long one and would be forced to use nuclear weapons;**
 - He urged the implementation of SEATO Plan 5 (major allied troop commitments, largely American), **but warned that U.S. strategic reserves were too low to deploy enough conventional forces to win, and that the use of nuclear weapons would be required “to win.”**
 - Burke (acting for Lemnitzer, who was with negotiator Averell Harriman in Laos) made this impassioned plea before visiting Congressional leaders invited to the WH meeting: *“If we do not fight in Laos, will we fight in Thailand, where the situation will be the same sometime in the future as it is now in Laos? Will we fight in Vietnam? Where will we fight? Where do we hold? Where do we draw the line?”*
 - **USMC Commandant Shoup and Army COS Decker warned that due to airlift limitations (only 2 useable airfields in Laos) only 1,000 troops per day could be put into Laos; and there was insufficient airlift capability to support even a limited offensive.**
 - **In the event of Chinese intervention in Laos based on the introduction of U.S. combat forces---the nightmare specter following the long stalemate in Korea in 1952-1953---the Chiefs favored seizure of Hainan Island by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Chinese forces based in Taiwan; the deployment of 250,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam, followed by assaults into Laos through North Vietnamese territory to block Chinese entry; and finally, the use of nuclear weapons if U.S. forces were overrun.**
- **The overall consensus of those in the room on April 27th was NOT to intervene; JFK took no action, but agreed with LBJ’s suggestion to let the Chiefs consult with each other and put their positions in writing. CNO Arleigh Burke objected to JFK’s inaction, and walked a memo insisting upon U.S. military intervention over to the White House later that day and personally delivered it to President Kennedy. An irritated JFK said, “This is settled,” and threw Burke out of the Oval Office. (Burke and JFK had tangled over whether or not to bail out the failed Bay of Pigs invasion just days earlier, which ended with Burke screaming at the President.)**
- **Two more key White House meetings were held on April 29th and May 1st.**

CNO Arleigh Burke and USAF Vice Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay
Repeatedly Recommended the Use of **Nuclear Weapons** in Laos

Arleigh Burke



Curtis LeMay



JFK Says “NO” to Combat Troops in Laos (3 of 3)

- Highlights of April 29th pre-meeting or “brainstorming session:”
 - CNO Burke: The loss of Laos would require the deployment of U.S. forces to Thailand and South Vietnam, and the U.S. might have to “throw in the works” [nuclear weapons] to win.
 - **Army COS Decker:** A conventional war in Laos is unwinnable, and if we go in it would mean bombing Hanoi and China, and perhaps using nuclear weapons; put U.S. troops in Thailand and South Vietnam, and go into Laos if a cease-fire was not obtained. He said “We should have gone in last August [in 1960].”
 - USAF Vice Chief of Staff LeMay: Implement SEATO Plan 5, air strikes, and war with China as well, saying: “We should go to work on China too and let Chiang take Hainan Island [where there were three Chinese divisions].”
 - **THERE WAS UNANIMITY AMONG THE CHIEFS (INCLUDING DECKER) THAT THE U.S. SHOULD INTERVENE MILITARILY IN LAOS; they only differed on the details.**
- One Major Decision Came Out of the April 29th White House Meeting: JFK allowed the Chiefs to plan for the possible introduction of two 5,000-man brigade sized units of ground troops to Udorn, Thailand and DaNang, Vietnam. JFK only authorized making *preparations* for these deployments, not the actual introduction of troops.
- On May 1, 1961 the Joint Chiefs submitted their written recommendations, and this time they were essentially unanimous, favoring the introduction of U.S. troops to Thailand, South Vietnam, and the portions of Laos not already overrun by the Pathet Lao.
 - A shocked JFK was informed that the introduction of only 10,000 troops to Southeast Asia would denude American strategic reserves needed to defend Berlin.
- By May 2, 1961 JFK had still not acted to send U.S. combat troops into Southeast Asia, and asked McNamara and Rusk for a “study” with recommendations; **the issue was essentially dead.** As Ted Sorensen said, Kennedy “combined bluff with real determination in proportions he made known to *no one.*”
- **JFK SAID TO ARTHUR SCHLESINGER:** “IF IT HADN’T BEEN FOR CUBA, WE MIGHT BE ABOUT TO INTERVENE IN LAOS.” WAVING A SHEAF OF CABLES FROM LEMNITZER, HE SAID, “I MIGHT HAVE TAKEN THIS ADVICE SERIOUSLY.”
- **JFK SAID TO TED SORENSEN:** “THANK GOD THE BAY OF PIGS HAPPENED WHEN IT DID...OTHERWISE WE’D BE IN LAOS BY NOW AND THAT WOULD BE A HUNDRED TIMES WORSE.”

JFK Scolds the Joint Chiefs of Staff---TWICE

- President Kennedy severely scolded the Joint Chiefs of Staff **twice** after the end of the Bay of Pigs and Laos debacles, in which he received such bad advice from the Pentagon leadership.
- **The *first scolding* took place in person on May 27, 1961 when he motored over to the Pentagon to do it in person, on their own turf.** It cannot have been a pleasant experience, for either him or them.
- The ***second scolding*** took place in NSAM 55, on **June 28, 1961**; **was addressed personally to JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer**; and was titled: **“Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations.”** The text is quoted in part below:
 - **“I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs...I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached...while I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in government is to combine all assets into a unified, effective pattern.”**
[Emphasis added]
- **JFK signed NSAM 55 himself**, which was unusual for most National Security Action Memoranda, which were usually signed by the President’s National Security Advisor (i.e., the head of the NSC).
- Three NSAMS issued that day---NSAMs 55, 56, and 57---reflected changes recommended by **General Maxwell Taylor**---the former Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower---who Kennedy had brought out of retirement to analyze the Bay of Pigs fiasco and to become his personal military advisor. In addition to NSAM 55 scolding the Chiefs for their poor and uncoordinated performance on Cuba and Laos, **NSAMs 56 and 57**, together, shifted responsibility for large paramilitary operations (such as the recent Bay of Pigs) **to the Pentagon instead of the CIA.** **The CIA, NSAM 57 announced, would only be responsible for executing paramilitary operations which were “wholly covert or disallowable” and which were within the “normal capabilities” of the Agency.**


The Full-Court Press on JFK for a Proxy War with Communism Shifts to Vietnam for the Remainder of 1961

[Recommended: *JFK and Vietnam, Second Edition*, by Dr. John Newman]

- From early May until late November of 1961, the pressure on JFK to go to war in South Vietnam to “save Southeast Asia” was **unrelenting**. (This subject is so well-covered in Newman’s *JFK and Vietnam* that the U.S. Army has opted not to write its own history of Vietnam for the years 1961-1963.)
- The JCS, and the “hawks” in the State Department, and on the NSC, **insisted that JFK commit combat troops to South Vietnam, since he failed to do so in Laos**. The pressure included:
 - Backchannel dealing in May 1961 between LBJ, General McGarr in-country, and Major General Ed Lansdale to get President Diem in South Vietnam to request “U.S. combat troops for training purposes.” [It didn’t work.]
 - Continued insistence throughout the summer and early fall by the Joint Chiefs, and by Walt Rostow on the NSC, that U.S. combat troops were needed immediately to prevent the loss of South Vietnam to the Communist Viet Cong. [JFK, preoccupied by the Berlin crisis, “didn’t bite,” because he wisely did not equate Vietnam in importance with Berlin.]
 - On October 11, at a key NSC meeting, State Department “hawk” U. Alexis Johnson presented a plan for immediate U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam that represented a consensus of what Maxwell Taylor, Walt Rostow, the Southeast Asia Task Force (one of JFK’s *ad hoc* study groups), and the JCS wanted to do, namely: **introduce 11,000 U.S. ground combat troops (out of a total SEATO force of 22,800)**. This was the “foot in the door” approach---the idea was that once there, it would be difficult to withdraw. The rationale for immediate deployment was the large growth in the size of the Viet Cong: now 16,000, eight thousand more guerillas than there were in 1960. As stated in his paper by Johnson, *“the costs [of sending troops now] would be much less than if we wait or go in later, or lose [South Vietnam].”*
 - **JFK was still against sending combat troops to Vietnam, but decided to send the Taylor-Rostow mission to South Vietnam to study the problem and make recommendations---preferably a recommendation NOT to deploy combat troops**. He made this clear to his personal military advisor---Maxwell Taylor---in the written instructions JFK provided to Taylor before the trip, and the President even planted a major newspaper leak with the *New York Times* that even Taylor himself, and many leaders in the Pentagon, were reluctant to send U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. The “leak” was untrue, but it was JFK’s way of pushing back against the assumptions in the press that U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam was inevitable, and sent a signal to his opponents in the Pentagon as well.
 - **When Taylor, Rostow, and Lansdale returned on November 2, 1961 their report, delivered November 3rd, recommended committing 8,000 U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam under the humanitarian cover of “flood relief” in the Mekong River delta. JFK was so displeased that he attempted to suppress all final copies of the report**. The fact that his favorite general had disobeyed his marching orders is revelatory about the extent to which JFK was almost the sole voice within the U.S. government advocating AGAINST combat troops in Vietnam.

Both General Maxwell Taylor and NSC “Hawk” Walt Rostow
Disobeyed JFK’s Instructions in October 1961 and Recommended the
Introduction of Combat Troops into South Vietnam

General Maxwell Taylor



NSC Official Walt Rostow



Full-Court Press on JFK Re: Placing U.S. Combat Troops in South Vietnam in 1961 (Conclusion)

- JFK was furious; he went to war with his national security establishment for the remainder of the month of November:
 - Lyman Lemnitzer, who held an apocalyptic, Manichean world view, favored U.S. intervention even more than Taylor did. In a caustic exchange with JCS Chairman Lemnitzer on November 15th, President Kennedy asked him “how he could justify the proposed courses of action in Vietnam while at the same time ignoring Cuba. General Lemnitzer hastened to add that the JCS feel that even at this point the United States should go into Cuba,” the NSC minutes reveal.
 - **As John Newman has written:** “...for Kennedy, Saigon was no Berlin. It illuminates the degree to which the President had become isolated from the cold warriors demanding a similar commitment to Vietnam. It is also a reminder of the lingering mutual animosity and grudges that sprang from the debacle in Cuba.”
- On November 22, 1961, JFK issued **NSAM 111**, his final policy position on Vietnam.
 - It contained no combat troops for Vietnam, and *no guarantees to save South Vietnam from Communism*.
 - But it did offer *a significant increase in American advisors and equipment*.
 - JFK would not go beyond this at any time during the remainder of his presidency.
 - **John Newman has written:** “Kennedy turned down combat troops, not when the decision was clouded by ambiguities...but when the battle was unequivocally desperate, when all concerned agreed that Vietnam’s fate hung in the balance, and when his principal advisors told him that vital U.S. interests in the region and in the world were at stake.”
- **The “Thanksgiving Day Massacre:”**
 - Beginning on November 26th and continuing through the 29th, Kennedy made numerous personnel changes on the NSC staff, in the State Department, and in the CIA---a major reshuffle which removed “hawks” from positions he did not any longer want them in, and blunting their influence by placing them in less important positions.
- On November 27, 1961 JFK chaired a meeting at which he invited those hawks who had particularly annoyed him throughout the year, including: Lemnitzer, Taylor, Lansdale, Rostow, Dean Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, William and McGeorge Bundy, and last---but not least---Allen Dulles, on his last day as CIA Director.
 - **JFK unloaded his frustrations over the lack of support for his Vietnam policy---which clearly was that it was primarily the people of South Vietnam who were responsible for their fate, NOT the United States.** He said: “When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out.” He ordered that there be “whole hearted support” for his decisions. When JFK asked who, at the Defense Department, would be responsible for carrying out his Vietnam policy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara loyally said: “**Myself and L.**” [“L” of course was Lemnitzer, but JFK had already decided that he must go, and was grooming Maxwell Taylor to be his new JCS Chairman.]

An Angry JFK Asked on November 27, 1961: “Who at the Defense Department Will Be Responsible for Carrying Out My Vietnam Policy?”

His Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara, said: **“Myself and L”**
Robert McNamara loyally carried out JFK’s withdrawal plans throughout 1963.



BERLIN: For President Kennedy, “A Place Worth Fighting For” (1 of 5)

[Recommended: *Into the Storm*, by Dr. John Newman; and *The Crisis Years*, by Michael Beschloss]

- JFK was as determined to defend Western access rights to Berlin as he was NOT to get involved with combat troops in either Cuba or Southeast Asia. For him, the credibility of the NATO Alliance and western resolve was at stake in Berlin---i.e., the fate of the Cold War itself.
 - JFK learned in April of 1961 that the U.S. had insufficient reserve forces to fight a war in either Cuba or Southeast Asia, and still respond to a crisis in Berlin with conventional forces.
 - Not only did he not equate Berlin with Saigon or Havana, but it was a matter of priorities.
 - Not sending combat troops to Cuba or Laos in 1961 ensured that U.S. conventional forces were available during the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1961.
- Sensing weakness on the part of JFK because of the Bay of Pigs debacle, Khrushchev sprung a trap on Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in early June of 1961: he indicated his intent to sign a peace treaty in 6 months (in December 1961) with East Germany (thus making permanent the temporary partition of Germany following the end of WWII), and in the process, to kick the three Western Allies (France, Great Britain, and the U.S.) out of West Berlin, which was deep inside East German territory.
- Premier Khrushchev’s final words on Berlin at the summit on June 4th were: *“I want peace, but if you want war, that is your problem.”* [Berlin was the “bone in his throat,” and the “ulcer” that Khrushchev wanted removed.]
- JFK responded: *“It is you, not I, who wants to force a change...It will be a cold winter.”*
- **The Soviet perspective:** Mother Russia had been invaded by western powers three times since 1812, and twice by Germany in the twentieth century (WWI and WWII). As the former capital of Germany, Berlin held unusual symbolic importance to the Soviet Union, since they had suffered the loss of 27 million dead during WWII, and much of their industry had been destroyed. They were profoundly afraid that the Western Powers would rearm a united Germany and then equip the Germans with nuclear weapons; furthermore, a significant “brain drain” of professionals were leaving the Eastern Bloc (and especially East Germany) daily, through the Berlin crossing points; and by the summer of 1961 the refugee exodus exceeded 1,000 persons per day, threatening the viability of East Germany’s economy and society.

President Kennedy and **Premier Khrushchev** at the
Vienna Summit: June 3-4, 1961



BERLIN: A Place Worth Fighting For (2 of 5)

- JFK's foreign policy had a "black eye" at home following the Bay of Pigs and Laos debacles, and his commitment to "fighting Communism" was being seriously questioned inside Washington, in the corridors of power. He himself thought that Khrushchev had underestimated him, and misjudged his resolve over Berlin at the Vienna Summit. *He spent all summer trying to change Premier Khrushchev's misperception of him.*
- On June 6, 1961 JFK spoke to the American people about the Vienna Summit, giving them a sober appreciation of the challenges ahead:
 - "...the Soviets and ourselves give totally different meanings to the same words---war, peace, democracy, and popular will. We have totally different views of right and wrong, of what is an internal affair and what is aggression. Above all, we have wholly different concepts of where the world is and where it is going."
 - "But our most sober talks were on the subject of Germany and Berlin. *I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that the security of western Europe and therefore our own security are deeply involved in our presence and our access rights to West Berlin, that those rights are based on law and not on sufferance, and that we are determined to maintain those rights at any risk,* and thus meet our obligation to the people of West Berlin and their right to choose their own future."
- For the remainder of June (and throughout most of July), JFK first established, and then monitored the work of an interdepartmental coordinating committee on how to deal with Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum.
 - Members included Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor; and two prominent right-wing "hawks," **Pentagon official Paul Nitze (the author of NSC-68), and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, invited in by JFK himself.**
 - **Acheson issued a report on June 28th and strongly recommended that JFK declare a National Emergency; prepare for conventional war by openly and rapidly increasing our forces in Europe; and that the U.S. openly prepare for nuclear war if necessary, to show the Soviets that we were serious about defending allied rights in Berlin.**
 - Dean Acheson viewed the Berlin crisis as a game of "international chicken" that was a test of wills between the U.S. and the USSR, with the outcome of the Cold War hanging in the balance. He dominated all of the internal discussions in June.
- On June 30, 1961, JFK sent a strong signal of his resolve to the USSR by promoting the bellicose USAF General Curtis LeMay (who had been Vice COS) to Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. LeMay had built the **Strategic Air Command (SAC)** into the most efficient killing machine in world history during the 1950s, and was not afraid of nuclear war, because of the overwhelming U.S. ³⁷ superiority in nuclear weapons AND delivery systems.

JFK Presides Over the Swearing-In of Curtis LeMay as USAF Chief of Staff on June 30, 1961

Because of his combat record and his lethal administration of SAC during the 1950s, JFK felt LeMay was the right man to lead the Air Force *during the Berlin Crisis*; **at the time this photo was taken, LeMay had already described Kennedy as a “coward” in an interview with journalist Fletcher Knebel, who then co-authored *Seven Days in May*, the bestselling novel about an attempted military coup in the United States.**



BERLIN: A Place Worth Fighting For (3 of 5)

- At a July 19, 1961 NSC meeting Acheson's idea to have the President declare a "**national emergency**," and in essence, **psychologically mobilize for war**, was rejected as **too provocative**; **Acheson had been supported in his apocalyptic recommendations by LBJ, Maxwell Taylor, and Paul Nitze**. But Secretary of Defense McNamara had pointed out that present preparations had created six additional Army divisions, and two additional Marine divisions, inside the continental United States---new forces that could be rapidly deployed to Europe if necessary. The NSC agreed that deploying them all to Europe at that time was considered too provocative, and unnecessary.
- **The serious game of international "chicken" had been escalating throughout June and July, however:**
 - On July 8th, in response to Kennedy's speech on June 6th, and no doubt the appointment of Curtis LeMay on June 30th, Khrushchev announced that planned cutbacks to Soviet defense spending had been cancelled, and that the USSR's defense spending would be increased by one third;
 - **In response, JFK** asked Congress for an equivalent dollar increase in the U.S. defense budget (\$3.5 billion); for a **TRIPLING** of the draft; the authority to increase the size of the Army from 875,000 to 1,000,000 men; and authority to call up the reserves (without resorting to a declaration of a national emergency);
 - Eventually, many Air Force and Navy reservists (some 90,000) were called on active duty, and deployed to Europe.
- JFK made a major foreign policy speech about Berlin on July 25, 1961 in which he sought to persuade the USSR of American resolve, while at the same time not provoking an escalation on the Soviet side; **he succeeded**. Major excerpts follow:
 - "The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin---and we have given our word that **an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all**;"
 - "...above all it [Berlin] has now become---as never before---the great testing place of Western courage and will;"
 - "We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force."
- **THE BERLIN WALL**: On August 13, 1961, the East Germans (with Soviet encouragement) began erecting the long-planned-for Berlin Wall, cutting off the "brain drain" caused by the refugee exodus that was threatening the viability of the East German state. As JFK privately remarked, "It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war." In his view, Khrushchev would not have erected a wall if he really intended to take all of Berlin by force. The wall was a huge propaganda victory for the West: the Communists were erecting a wall and turning East Berlin and all of East Germany into a prison---to keep their own people from leaving.

In JFK's Berlin Speech on July 25, 1961 He Declared: "We Cannot and Will Not Permit the Communists to Drive Us Out of Berlin, Either Gradually or By Force"



BERLIN: A Place Worth Fighting For (4 of 5)

- On August 18, 1961 JFK sent a **symbolic military supply convoy** of about 1,600 men through 110 miles of East German territory, on the autobahn, to the isolated city of West Berlin, to **demonstrate Allied determination and to find out whether the East Germans and Soviets would block access to Berlin as they had in 1948**. After some face-saving procedural delays, the convoy was allowed through and was met in West Berlin, to great fanfare, on August 20th by LBJ and former General Lucius Clay ("Der Clay"), a tough hombre who had been the Allied military governor of Berlin in 1948 during the Soviet Blockade. *The successful passage of the convoy meant that there would be no blockade of Berlin again, as there had been in 1948.*
- Ominously, with Berlin as the backdrop, **the USSR announced on August 30th** that it would **drop the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing** that it had begun on March 31, 1958 (and observed by both sides since October 31, 1958), and **that it would soon resume nuclear testing**. **JFK's private response was an impassioned expletive: "Fucked again!"** *JFK would reluctantly follow suit on April 25, 1962---at the insistence of the national security establishment.*
- In September 1961, following discussions with SACEUR (USAF General Lauris Norstad), Robert McNamara became alarmed about the cavalier attitude Norstad displayed with regard to the seemingly inevitable use by Allied forces (NATO) of nuclear weapons in Europe should the Soviet Union attempt to overrun West Germany and/or take West Berlin by force, using the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Red Army. In a 2004 video interview, McNamara said: "The stated NATO policy and the stated U.S. policy with respect to nuclear weapons was that *we would initiate their use* in the event of some conventional military force action by the Soviets or Warsaw Pact against the West...I said to the President, 'Mr. President, this is the U.S. stated policy, this is the stated NATO policy, [but] never, never, never follow that' ...the stated nuclear policy of the U.S. was wrong, and it's wrong today."
- On October 25, 1961 a **tense standoff between Soviet and American tanks** took place before the eyes of the world at "Checkpoint Charlie" in West Berlin, the only remaining crossing point between West and East Berlin. *This threat display, an exercise in "contrived theatricality" that was successfully managed behind the scenes by JFK and Khrushchev, was frightening because if it had not been managed successfully, and conventional warfare had erupted, that conflict (by doctrine) could quickly have escalated into* ⁴¹ *nuclear war.*

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Was Increasingly Disturbed in the Fall of 1961 when General Lauris Norstad Strongly Resisted Civilian Attempts to Control His Prospective Use of **Nuclear Weapons** to Defend Berlin; *Norstad Insisted This Was His Decision Alone*

SECDEF Robert S. McNamara



SACEUR Lauris Norstad



JFK Consults with Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer During the Berlin Crisis



Berlin: A Place Worth Fighting For (5 of 5)

- **FOUR DAYS EARLIER, on October 21, 1961,** Deputy Secretary of Defense **Roswell Gilpatric** had given a carefully crafted speech in which he announced to the world that **contrary to Khrushchev's boasts since 1957, there was no Soviet superiority in ICBMs---that in fact, the opposite was the case.** Gilpatric made this clear by quoting numerous facts and statistics, and summarized: **"The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack on our forces would be as great as---perhaps even greater than---the total undamaged forces which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike. In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first."**
 - In September of 1961 the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) had finally, and officially, caught up with the true reality of the **"missile gap,"** based upon highly successful Corona photosatellite surveillance during the summer, and information from the American mole in the Soviet command structure, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.
 - The September NIE **reduced** the U.S. estimate of Soviet ICBMs **down** from the previously **overestimated** 140-200, to **between only 10-25 operational ICBMs (still an exaggeration).**
 - Gilpatric spoke of a force of 600 heavy, long-range nuclear bombers; six Polaris submarines that could launch IRBMs from under the sea; and dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles (many more than the Soviets actually had).
 - The publicly-admitted American nuclear superiority would have a serious effect upon Soviet behavior in 1962, but that was not known at this time.
- **October 30, 1961: THE "TSAR BOMBA."** The Soviet reaction to the Gilpatric speech, and earlier JFK assurances of our strength on October 11th (namely, a 14% increase in defense spending; increases in nuclear delivery vehicles and their alert status; and more non-nuclear forces, including two new divisions of troops), **was to explode a 50-megaton airburst, the largest thermonuclear weapon ever detonated, about 1,570 times more powerful than the 2 fission bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined.** The massive weapon was more about intimidation and propaganda than practicality: it could not be put on any existing Soviet rocket because at 26 feet long, almost 7 feet wide, and weighing 27 tons, **it was too large and too heavy.**
- **Slowly, quietly, the Berlin crisis fizzled out, and Khrushchev never did sign a peace treaty with East Germany or try to cut off West Berlin from Allied access, after all of his threats to do so. Kennedy was right: the Berlin Wall was not an elegant solution, but it was better than a war---for both sides.**

The “Tsar Bomba” Was Originally Designed to Be a 100-Megaton Weapon, But Its Yield Was Lowered to 50-Megatons, Out of Concern About Extreme Fallout Effects Inside the USSR. (It Was Tested in the Arctic, North of Siberia.)
[Initial U.S. Estimates Were That It Actually Had a Yield of 57-58 Megatons.]




Shown Here Is the **“Tsar Bomba” Mushroom Cloud** and a Map of The Total Destructive Blast Radius Superimposed on the Metropolitan Area Around Paris, France

Mushroom Cloud As Seen From 100 Miles Away



Map of 35 Kilometer Blast Radius If Dropped on Paris, France



Nuclear War and Worldwide Destruction Was a Distinct Possibility During JFK's Presidency

[Recommended: *JFK and the Unspeakable*, by Jim Douglass; and *Dark Sun*, by Richard Rhodes]

- **THE "SIOP" BRIEFING ON JULY 20, 1961:** Literally in the midst of the **Berlin Crisis**, President Kennedy was briefed for the first time on the Single Integrated Operational Plan [for nuclear war], called "**SIOP-62**" [each SIOP was named for the fiscal year to which it applied]. The briefer was USAF General Hickey, Chairman of the 'Net Evaluation Subcommittee' of the National Security Council. Also present were General Lyman Lemnitzer and DCI Allen Dulles. The SIOP was described in different ways by different people:
 - Arthur Schlesinger (Presidential Counselor): **"the Net Evaluation, an annual doomsday briefing analyzing the chances of nuclear war;"**
 - McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor): **"a formal briefing on the net assessment of a general nuclear war between the two superpowers."**
- **THE NATURE OF THE PLAN:**
 - **"A massive, total, comprehensive, obliterating strategic attack...on everything Red."** (McGeorge Bundy)
 - **It called for the overwhelming destruction of all Communist Bloc nations---both military bases and urban/industrial centers---in the event of war with any one of its members.** (Thus, China would have been destroyed in the event of war with the USSR, and so would little Albania; and China was still a non-nuclear power at this time. Also on the hit list were the Eastern Bloc nations in the Warsaw Pact, North Korea, and North Vietnam.)
 - **The plan was Wagnerian, and genocidal; and it offered no flexibility---it was "all or nothing."**
- **DURING THE BRIEFING, Kennedy was presented with a plan for a nuclear surprise attack on the Soviet Union---a first strike---"in late 1963, preceded by a period of heightened tensions."**
- **JFK, shocked and disgusted, dramatically got up and walked out in the middle of the briefing, saying to Dean Rusk afterwards: **"And we call ourselves the human race."****

The Curtis LeMay Problem

Robert McNamara said:

“LeMay believed that ultimately we were going to have to confront these people [the USSR] in a conflict with nuclear weapons, and by God, we’d better do it when we have greater superiority than we will have in the future.”

David Talbot wrote (in *Brothers*) that LeMay predicted at a Washington D.C. cocktail party in July '61 **that nuclear war was inevitable**, and would break out by the end of the year---and that Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit would be incinerated, **as well as most Soviet cities.**



The Curtis LeMay Problem (continued)

- **Curtis LeMay** had been a courageous and hard-driving, lead-from-the-front **B-17 commander** in the Eighth Air Force in England during World War II; he had also conceived of, and engineered, the merciless (and very effective) low-level B-29 firebombing campaign against Japan that killed between 50-90% of the residents of 67 Japanese cities. LeMay had helped the Air Force to found the RAND Corporation in 1946; and was the senior commander in charge of the successful **Berlin airlift** that he organized in 1948, which kept Berlin and its residents alive for 11 months during Stalin's blockade of Western ground access to the city.
- Afterwards, Curtis LeMay took command of an immature, ineffective **Strategic Air Command (SAC)** organization in late 1948, **and led SAC from 1949-1957**---through its adolescence into adulthood---transforming it into the most feared arsenal of destruction in the history of the world. He transformed SAC from a propeller-driven to an all-jet force, concentrating upon strategic bombing, the delivery of nuclear weapons to the enemy---and the only enemy America had was the Soviet Union. **He was a driven personality *who considered that America was already at war with the USSR*, and drilled that mentality into his subordinates at SAC.**
- LeMay was crude, bull-headed, profane, inflexible, demanding, and used to getting his way. He was not a team player. **By the time he became Air Force Chief of Staff, he was contemptuous of civilian authority.**
- **As head of SAC, LeMay repeatedly ordered provocative overflights and incursions into Soviet air space in an attempt to provoke World War III**---something he openly admitted to others---namely, an overreaction by the USSR that would permit SAC to launch a pre-emptive strike. His philosophy was to deliver a "Sunday punch," an overwhelming offensive attack of more than 80% of his weapons in one blow, that would go on without stop, for several days. *In his memoirs he seemingly expressed poignant regret that the U.S. had failed to eliminate the USSR in the early-to-mid 1950s, when SAC could have done so (according to LeMay) without any losses except those due to normal flight accidents.*
- **His Chief of Staff at SAC and self-appointed relief was General Tommy Power, a man LeMay later described as "not stable," and a "sadist."** Both LeMay and Power would seriously clash with President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 (more on this later).
- **President Kennedy** had a kind of "fit" anytime someone mentioned LeMay's name, and once stated to an aide, "I don't want that man near me again." **Part of the language in JFK's Peace Speech in June of 1963 was specifically inserted by him to counter a speech that LeMay had made (more on this later).**
- **LeMay accused President Kennedy of being a "coward" in an off-the-record interview about the Bay of Pigs with journalist Fletcher Knebel sometime in 1961; LeMay's intense animus and personal criticism of the President disturbed Knebel so much that he co-authored the bestseller *Seven Days in May* (published in 1962), about a hypothetical military coup to get rid of a dangerously "weak" President and install a military dictatorship to run the United States Government.** President Kennedy later encouraged his friend, filmmaker John Frankenheimer, to make the film during 1963, which is now a cult classic.

**“Happy Together?”
(Answer: NO)**

USAF Chief of Staff Curtis
LeMay and SAC
Commander Tommy
Power (LeMay’s protégé)
seen with the Commander
in Chief at SAC
Headquarters, Offutt Air
Force Base, in Nebraska.

LeMay and Power would
both clash in serious ways
with President Kennedy
during the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis.



1961 Was an Extremely Difficult Year for President Kennedy, and Ended in a Standoff of Mutual Distrust Between Him and Much of the National Security Establishment; By the End of 1962, Their Relations Would Be Characterized By Mutual Contempt

- **HOW MANY MILITARY FLAG OFFICERS VIEWED JFK:**
 - **Weak and indecisive; unable to make up his mind;**
 - Fond of delaying tactics when he couldn't make up his mind (*ad hoc* committees, requests for additional studies);
 - **Afraid to confront Communism on the battlefield;**
 - “Squeamish” about the prospect of nuclear war, which many viewed as inevitable.
- **HOW JFK VIEWED MUCH OF THE MILITARY SENIOR LEADERSHIP:**
 - **Dishonest;** they had lied to him when assessing the Bay of Pigs operation, and then tried to manipulate him.
 - **Too willing to commit troops into combat situations** without adequate staff studies and without consideration of the “big picture” globally [for example, what effect would sending combat troops into Cuba or Southeast Asia have on the ability to defend Berlin with conventional forces?];
 - Too many were empty shells hiding behind their ribbons, and the stars on their uniforms, and the scrambled eggs on their hats; **their lack of critical thinking, and lack of a broad viewpoint of the world, and lack of nuance when considering or formulating national policy and objectives, troubled him.**
 - **Far too willing to espouse using nuclear weapons;** too many senior military officers seemed to view them as simply a better way to accomplish strategic bombing, and did not consider them the “absolute horror” that he did.
- **JFK's VIEW OF THE CIA COVERT OPERATORS (NOT THE ANALYSTS):**
 - **Dishonest;** the leadership had all lied to him about the prospects of success for the Bay of Pigs;
 - **Not worth a damn when it came to covert operations:** should be “splintered into a thousand pieces.”
- **THE CIA's VIEW OF JFK (THE COVERT OPERATORS, NOT THE ANALYSTS):**
 - **Very wary;** they knew that as a Federal Agency they were now “in the bull's eye.”
 - **They knew their many years of lack of accountability to anyone were OVER.**
- **CIVILIAN HAWKS at DEFENSE AND STATE, and JFK:**
 - **Mutual frustration and impatience is the best way to** 51 **describe these relations.**

Historian Robert Dallek Summarized the Mutual Lack of Respect Between JFK and His Military Chiefs with Three Key Quotes in his 2013 Atlantic article, titled: *“JFK vs. the Military”*

- JFK:
 - “The first thing I’m going to tell my successor is to watch the generals, and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men, their opinion on military matters was worth a damn.” [Emphasis added]
 - *“These sons of bitches with all the fruit salad just sat there nodding [during many of the meetings prior to the Bay of Pigs] saying it would all work.”*
- **Lyman Lemnitzer** (unfairly comparing JFK to Eisenhower):
 - *“Here was a President who had no military experience at all, sort of a patrol boat skipper from World War II.”*
 - Additionally, John Newman has written that Lemnitzer *“deplored the tendency of the U.S. government to waste time quibbling over policy.”*

Robert Dallek: “The clash with Arleigh Burke, the tensions over nuclear-war planning, and the bumbling at the Bay of Pigs convinced Kennedy that a primary task of his Presidency was to bring the military under control.” [Emphasis added]

In 1962, JFK's Conflict With His Military Leadership Escalated to Alarming Levels, and the U.S. and USSR Flirted With Nuclear Apocalypse During the Cuban Missile Crisis

- JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer, working together with the Operations Officer for the "Mongoose" Project, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, proposed a series of disturbing PRETEXTS FOR WAR WITH CUBA that were designed to be the public justification for an overwhelming U.S. military invasion to overthrow Castro, and institute REGIME CHANGE in Cuba.
 - "Mongoose," which was initiated on November 30, 1961, was the Kennedy brothers' program to promote economic warfare, sabotage, and propaganda actions against Cuba in an attempt to stimulate REGIME CHANGE. The only thing ruled out was a U.S. invasion.
 - Behind JFK's back, Lemnitzer got Lansdale to request that the Joint Staff develop a policy statement on Cuba, and PRETEXTS FOR A U.S. INVASION; they worked together on this project from mid-January through mid-March 1962. On paper, it looked like the whole thing originated with Lansdale---but it was a joint effort wholly supported, and probably initiated, by Lemnitzer himself.
 - Lemnitzer and the Chiefs heartily endorsed the many proposed PRETEXTS FOR INVASION OF CUBA and forwarded them to Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 13, 1962. The name of the file was OPERATION NORTHWOODS. As John Newman has written, "*From the very beginning, Lemnitzer had been using Kennedy's point man---General Lansdale---to turn Operation Mongoose into Operation NORTHWOODS. Lansdale had become a stalking horse for Lemnitzer.*"
- JFK unequivocally rejected the idea of pretexts for war, and also rejected, once again, the concept of a U.S. invasion of Cuba, in a seminal March 16, 1962 meeting with Lemnitzer, Lansdale, and others.
- On April 10, 1962---*in an act of unparalleled insubordination*---Lemnitzer and the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the United States invade Cuba anyway (without using pretexts to justify the action), and did so in extremely strong language that was apocalyptic in nature, in what amounted to a scolding leveled at SECDEF and the President, *which adopted the tone of an ultimatum.*
- Soviet MRBMs were discovered in Cuba during a U-2 surveillance flight on October 14, 1962, and the ensuing Cuban Missile Crisis (from October 16-28) brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war.
- Although JFK resolved the crisis through diplomacy, he clashed seriously with the Chiefs, who insisted that the United States launch massive air strikes against Cuba, and follow with a full-scale invasion.
- The consensus of the Joint Chiefs afterward was that JFK had failed in his duty, and they accused him to his face of what amounted to weakness and cowardice---of LOSING.

The Collaborators on the “NORTHWOODS” Scheme to Use Pretexts to Justify a U.S. Invasion of Cuba

Major General Ed Lansdale



JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer



The “NORTHWOODS” File

Discovered and Declassified by the ARRB (1 of 3)

[Recommended: *Inside the ARRB* (Vol. 5), by Douglas Horne; and *Into the Storm*, by Dr. John Newman]

- On January 17, 1962 Lansdale requested a policy statement on Cuba from the Joint Staff planners in the Pentagon. General Craig (Lemnitzer’s chief of covert action on the Joint Staff, and the author of the pretexts for war in the NORTHWOODS papers) responded on February 7, 1962:
 - “The Soviets could establish land, sea, and/or air bases in Cuba;
 - The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.”

[The Joint Staff (above) was either unusually prescient, or it had advance knowledge of what the Soviets were considering doing, which the current historical record concludes was not formally considered by the Soviet Government, at Khrushchev’s request, until May of 1962, and not approved until June 10th.]

 - “The Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere.”
- On February 5, 1962 Lansdale requested in writing that the Joint Staff prepare pretexts for the invasion of Cuba. (This tasking put into motion the invasion plan that Lemnitzer and Lansdale had cooked up together.)
- On March 9, 1962, the Joint Staff (General Craig) sent the whole kit and caboodle---a long shopping list of imaginative PRETEXTS FOR WAR designed to justify a U.S. invasion of Cuba---to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. The list had been over one month in the making.
- On March 13, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the entire package---by cover letter signed personally by General Lyman Lemnitzer---to the Secretary of Defense. It was a TOP SECRET, Special Handling, NOFORN (no foreign dissemination) memorandum titled: “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba.” The code name for the entire operation was “NORTHWOODS.”

The “NORTHWOODS” File

Discovered and Declassified by the ARRB (2 of 3)

- The PRETEXTS FOR WAR WITH CUBA included:
 - Fake a Cuban attack on the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, and blame it on Castro’s forces;
 - A fake “Remember the Maine” incident could be engineered in which a U.S. ship could be blown up and sunk in Guantanamo Bay, and blamed on Castro;
 - “We could develop a Communist Cuban Terror Campaign *in the Miami area, in other Florida cities, or even in Washington.* The Terror Campaign could be pointed at the Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. **We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated).** We could foster attempts on the lives of Cuban refugees in the United States *even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.*” In addition, “a few plastic bombs” could be exploded “in carefully chosen spots; the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement would also be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible [Castro] government.”
 - A U.S. fighter jet (like an F-86) could be painted to look like a Russian MiG, and could simulate an attack on a real U.S. airliner filled with passengers;
 - A real commercial airliner---turned into a drone without passengers onboard---could be flown on autopilot after leaving its secret base in Florida (Eglin Field), and blown up by a bomb over Cuba, AFTER the broadcast of a taped recording from onboard the aircraft during which the “pilots” are heard describing an “attack” by Cuban MiG fighters.
 - A U.S. submarine could deposit at sea parts from a “destroyed” U.S. fighter plane which had been supposedly “shot down” by Cuban MiG fighter planes; this hoax would be supported by actual aircraft flying at low altitude and transmitting false radio messages simulating an attack, prior to the submarine depositing the debris at sea.

The “NORTHWOODS” File

Discovered and Declassified by the ARRB (3 of 3)

- THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS STATED:
 - “...determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment [sic] during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban ‘provocation’ as justification for positive U.S. military action.”
 - “...it is recognized that any action that becomes a **pretext** for U.S. military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action...”
 - “...the suggested courses of action appended...are based on the premise that **U.S. military intervention will result from a period of heightened U.S.-Cuban tensions** which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances.”
- John Newman wrote: “The Founding Fathers of the American Republic would have been outraged. They probably turned over in their graves at the **moral depravity** of General Lemnitzer and those Chiefs who agreed with his Northwoods recommendations.”
- Newman added, speaking as a former Army officer: “General Lemnitzer betrayed his country, and his oath of office to protect and defend its constitution.”
- MY OWN ASSESSMENT: The Allies convicted and executed Nazi generals and former officials at Nuremberg following World War II for “**conspiracy to commit aggressive war.**” The **NORTHWOODS** scheme was nothing less---*it was* CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT AGGRESSIVE WAR.

JFK Rejects “Northwoods”

[Recommended: *Brothers*, by David Talbot]

- On March 16, 1962---three days after Lemnitzer signed and submitted his “Northwoods” memo to McNamara---JFK rejected the concept of pretexts justifying a U.S. invasion of Cuba.
- Present at the Oval Office meeting requested by President Kennedy were **General Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Major General Edward Lansdale, McGeorge Bundy, and CIA Director John McCone.**
- **David Talbot** reconstructed what happened from meeting minutes written by Ed Lansdale that were not declassified until March 28, 2005.
- Talbot writes that at one point the irrepressible **Lansdale** began to hold forth, saying “*we must be ready to intervene with U.S. forces, if necessary.*”
- **JFK responded immediately** by asking negatively that the group wasn’t proposing that he authorize military intervention, was it? “**No,**” Taylor rushed to reassure him.
- **But Lemnitzer couldn’t restrain himself**, and ran “Northwoods” up the flagpole by saying that the Joint Chiefs “*had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force [against Cuba], with the pretexts either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we would retaliate.*”
- Talbot writes that Kennedy was not amused, fixed Lemnitzer with a hard look, and “*said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force,*” according to Lansdale’s minutes; and that the President made the point that Lemnitzer might not have enough divisions to fight in Cuba, if the Soviets responded by going to war over Berlin or elsewhere.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed back 25 days later---on April 10, 1962---with perhaps the most insubordinate proposal that they ever sent to JFK (see next slide).

The Joint Chiefs Strike Back on April 10, 1962

[Recommended: *JFK's War*, by Douglas Horne]

- In a scolding, insistent memo to Secretary of Defense McNamara, titled: "Cuba," the JCS insisted on invading Cuba anyway, without offering any pretexts this time. Excerpts follow:
 - "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the Cuba problem must be solved in the near future. Furthermore, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present Communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic, or psychological pressures. [In other words, "Mongoose" is worthless.] Accordingly, they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present Communist regime."
 - "The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere...While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to U.S. bases around the Bloc periphery..."
 - "Time favors the Cuban regime and the Communist Bloc..."
 - "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war...Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required."
 - "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty."
- This "stink bomb" (a term used by John Newman to describe this and other missives on Laos and Vietnam policy similar to it) has about it the flavor and tone of **AN ULTIMATUM**. Once Soviet medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) were discovered in Cuba in mid-October of 1962, this surely became their "we told you so" document, and provided them with what they considered the moral high ground with JFK when they insisted that he bomb and invade Cuba during the Missile 59 Crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: October 16-28, 1962


The USSR Places MRBMs with Nuclear Warheads in Cuba

[Recommended: *Eyeball to Eyeball*, by Dino Brugioni; *One Minute to Midnight*, by Michael Dobbs; *DEFCON-2*, by Polmar and Gresham; and *The Kennedy Tapes*, by May and Zelikow]




On August 29, 1962,
High-Altitude U-2
Surveillance Photos of
Eight (8) Soviet SA-2
Missile Sites Under
Construction in Cuba
Provided *Indirect*
Confirmation of CIA
Director John McCone's
Prediction, Earlier That
Month, That the USSR
Would Place **Nuclear**
Missiles in Cuba.

*The SA-2 anti-aircraft
batteries were being
installed to protect the
MRBMs, which were on
the way.*



What NATO Called the “SA-2 Guideline” Missile, the Soviets Called the “S-75 Dvina”

**A Completed “SA-2” Missile Site in
Cuba Photographed by the U-2**



**An Outdoor Display of the S-75
“Dvina” Anti-Aircraft Missile**



The SA-2 Missile Was the World's Best Anti-Aircraft Missile, and Had Previously Shot Down the U-2 Aircraft Flown by CIA Pilot Francis Gary Powers Over Russia on May 1, 1960;
(The USSR eventually installed 144 of their S-75 missiles in Cuba at 24 different sites.)




The U-2 Flight of **October 14, 1962** Revealed the Presence of the Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba


The U-2 Was a Fragile, High-Altitude Photo-Reconnaissance Aircraft Previously Used Over the USSR; the **U.S. Air Force** Took Over All U-2 Flights from the CIA on **October 12, 1962**.



The Evidence Was First Shown to President Kennedy on October 16, 1962...



MRBM FIELD LAUNCH SITE
SAN CRISTOBAL NO 2
14 OCTOBER 1962



15 OCT 1962
MRBM LAUNCH SITE
SAN DIEGO DE LOS BANOS
22-40N 83-17W



4 PROBABLE
ERECTOR/LAUNCHER EQUIPMENT

8 MISSILE TRAILERS

EQUIPMENT

TENT AREAS


CONSTRUCTION

Additional U-2 Missions Were Quickly Flown Over Cuba...



...Revealing That Launch Sites for IRBMs (Longer Range Missiles) Were Also Under Construction...

[Although the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) Never Made It to Cuba]



Later, Low Level Photography Taken by Different Aircraft Captured Much Better, and More Persuasive Images (1 of 2)



Later, Low Level Photography Taken by Different Aircraft Captured Much Better, and More Persuasive Images (2 of 2)



WHY Did the USSR Send Nuclear Missiles to Cuba?

- *Ultimately*, it was the Soviet reaction to the USSR's nuclear inferiority, as revealed by the Roswell Gilpatric speech on October 21, 1961 at the height of the Berlin Crisis. His speech revealed that there **WAS** a "missile gap" and a "bomber gap"---**but one that favored the United States**---**Khrushchev's big bluff had been called.**
- In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev met with his Defense Council at his Pitsunda resort on the Black Sea, and they informed him that the USSR's armed forces could neither successfully defend the homeland, nor would they be able to respond militarily afterwards, if there were a nuclear first strike by the United States. (Curtis LeMay and SAC had known this throughout the mid and late 1950s; Roswell Gilpatric had made it public knowledge.)
- Robert McNamara has subsequently stated that **in 1962 the United States had a 17:1 advantage over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons**---and the Soviets were painfully aware of that now.
- The diplomatic containment proposed by George Kennan following the end of WW II had morphed into **military containment** of the Soviet Union after **NSC-68** was adopted and implemented in late 1950. The massive stockpiling of nuclear weapons recommended by NSC-68 had created the 17:1 strategic advantage. As the Soviets feared, the peril of one side possessing such dominance was that it would tempt that side to USE IT.
- Four reasons the Soviets deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba were:
 - To redress somewhat the marked Soviet strategic inferiority in long-range nuclear weapons;
 - To defend their only Communist client state in the Western Hemisphere against invasion;
 - To permit them to apply **LEVERAGE against Berlin** once the missiles in Cuba were operational and the *fait accompli* was publicly announced in late November.
 - **"Putting a hedgehog in Uncle Sam's pants"** (as Khrushchev put it) was a way of expressing their supreme displeasure over military encirclement by U.S. nuclear bases.
- **The historical record indicates that the preliminary Soviet government approvals to deploy nukes to Cuba were made on May 21 and May 24, 1962; the final, formal decision was made on June 10, 1962** (after logistical surveys in Cuba and discussion of the matter with Castro).

Timeline of Essential Cuban Missile Crisis Events

- **October 14, 1962:** U-2 flight photographs MRBMs in Cuba; the photography is developed and evaluated on Oct 14th-15th.
- **October 16, 1962:** President Kennedy is informed, and commences interdepartmental EXCOMM meetings on at least a daily basis.
- **October 19, 1962:** JFK meets alone with the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they all favor massive air strikes followed by an invasion.
- **October 20, 1962:** EXCOMM and RFK begin to develop a **consensus for blockade and diplomatic pressure, instead of bombing and invasion**---to the displeasure of the JCS and some members of EXCOMM.

- **October 22, 1962:** JFK briefs key members of Congress about the blockade decision and is sharply criticized for a weak response; he then addresses the nation on national TV and announces the blockade, and U.S. determination to get the missiles out of Cuba. The nation's military, on his order, escalates from DEFCON-5 to DEFCON-3 status to send a signal of military readiness to the USSR.
- **October 23, 1962:** Dean Rusk secures unanimous OAS approval of the U.S. blockade (only Uruguay abstained; Cuba was a no-show).
- **October 23, 1962:** President Kennedy signs the "quarantine" order that evening.
- **October 24, 1962:** The "quarantine" (blockade) of Cuba commences. JFK later contracts the blockade line, to reduce the chances of a confrontation at sea, and to give the Soviets time to make the right decision (i.e., not to challenge the blockade).

- **October 24, 1962:** General Tommy Power of SAC increases the DEFCON condition for the Strategic Air Command from DEFCON-3 to DEFCON-2, with two announcements in the clear (one a voice transmission to all of SAC, and the other an unencrypted military cable). This sent a serious escalatory signal to the USSR without JFK's permission, and contrary to his wishes. Tommy Power and SAC could have started World War III (and Power and LeMay may have wanted to).

- **October 27, 1962:** "Black Saturday;" EXCOMM and JFK struggle over how to respond to two different Soviet messages on the crisis; a U-2 piloted by USAF Major Rudolph Anderson is shot down over Cuba by a Soviet SA-2 missile, contrary to the orders of Moscow; a U-2 flight in the Arctic gets lost and inadvertently strays over Siberia; RFK meets with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin Saturday evening and makes very clear to him that war is imminent if the missiles are not removed from Cuba. EXCOMM had decided to begin bombing on Tuesday, October 30th---and follow 8 days later with an invasion---if the Soviets have not capitulated. **All of the Soviet MRBMs are now operational, and most of the units have been rehearsing launch procedures. Three (3) "FKR" tactical nuclear cruise missiles are aimed at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, ready to fire if there is a U.S. invasion; other tactical nukes (both FKR and LUNAs) are capable of obliterating a U.S. invasion. [Strangely, U.S. planners did not cancel the invasion in spite of detecting LUNA launchers.]**
- **October 28, 1962:** **Khrushchev capitulates over Radio Moscow** (to ensure the message is received in a timely manner), and the most severe phase of the Missile Crisis ends. Tensions remained high as the U.S. monitored withdrawal in November, and insisted on removal of all of the Soviet IL-28 medium jet bombers as well. JFK announced the crisis over and ended the quarantine or blockade on November 20th, after the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28 bombers from Cuba. [The U.S. still knew nothing about all the tactical nuclear warheads or the 80 "FKR" tactical cruise missiles; the USSR decided to remove the tactical nukes unilaterally because of Castro's instability, and did so in December.]

President Kennedy Consults with SECDEF McNamara and JCS Chairman Taylor

The ExComm, or Executive Committee of the National Security Council, met at least once daily throughout the Missile Crisis in October of 1962, and throughout most of November.







The Joint Chiefs of Staff Confront President Kennedy on October 19, 1962 (1 of 5) and General LeMay Crosses the Line and Is Grossly Insubordinate

[Source: *The Presidential Recordings*, (Vol. 2), Edited by Naftali and Zelikow]

- Crucial excerpts follow; Maxwell Taylor tried to run an urbane and respectful meeting, but it didn't quite work out that way:
- Taylor: "From the outset I would say we were united on the military requirement: we could not accept Cuba as a missile base; that we should either eliminate or neutralize the missiles there and prevent any others from coming in. *From a military point of view that meant three things: **first, attack with the benefit of surprise**...Secondly, continued surveillance then to see what the effect would be. And third, a blockade to prevent any others from coming in...*"
- JFK: "**...First, I think we ought to think of why the Russians did this...if we attack Cuba, the missiles or Cuba, in any way then it gives them a clear line to take Berlin**, as they were able to do in Hungary [in 1956] under the Anglo [-French-Israeli] war in Egypt [i.e., the Suez Crisis]...**we would be regarded as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no support among our allies...**"
- Taylor: "...I think we'd all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin, our strength anywhere in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. ***And if we don't respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility of our response in Berlin is endangered.***"

The Joint Chiefs Confront Kennedy on Oct. 19th (2 of 5)

- **LeMay:** "...I'd emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that *we don't have any choice but direct military action*. If we do this blockade that's proposed and political action, the first thing that's going to happen is that your missiles are going to disappear into the woods...now, we can't find them then, regardless of what we do...*Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don't share your view that if we knock off Cuba, that they're going to knock off Berlin*. We've got the Berlin problem staring us in the face anyway. If we don't do anything in Cuba, then they're going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they've got us on the run..."
- **JFK:** "What do you think their reprisal would be?"
- **LeMay:** "*I don't think they're going to make any reprisal if we tell them that the Berlin situation is just like it's always been*. If they make a move we're going to fight...So I see no other solution. *This blockade and political action, I see leading into war*. I don't see any other solution for it [except direct military action]. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. [Pause] Because if this blockade comes along, we're going to gradually drift into a war under conditions that are a great disadvantage to us...*I just don't see any other solution except direct military intervention right now.*"

The Joint Chiefs Confront Kennedy on Oct. 19th (3 of 5)

- **Anderson:** “...*the course of action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view is the right one*...If we institute a blockade, from a military point of view we can carry it out...[but] the blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba and will provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles...to get...their command and control system ready to go...*I do not see that, as long as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solution to the Cuba problem except a military solution...*”
- **Wheeler:** “...in my judgment, from a military point of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting the people of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go ahead with a surprise airstrike, the blockade, and an invasion...And so as I say, from a military point of view, I feel that the lowest-risk course of action is the full gamut of military action by us. That’s it, sir.”
- **JFK:** “Thank you, General.”
- **Shoup:** “...in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat...**then we’re going to have to go in there and do it in a full-time job to eliminate the threat against us.** Then *if you want to take over the place and really put in a new government that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place.* And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of a decisive success and as quick as possible.”

The Joint Chiefs Confront Kennedy on Oct. 19th (4 of 5)

- LeMay: "...And you [addressing JFK] have made some pretty strong statements...that we would take action against offensive weapons. *I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I'm sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too. In other words, you're in a pretty bad fix at the present time."*
- JFK: "What did you say?"
- LeMay: "You're in a pretty bad fix."
- JFK: "You're in there with me." [Slightly forced laughter in the background] "Personally."
- LeMay: "I think we have got to do more than take out the missiles, because if you don't take out their air at the same time you're vulnerable..."
- JFK: "...You know, as I say, **the problem is not really some war against Cuba**...the problem is part of this worldwide struggle where we face the Communists, particularly, as I say, *over Berlin...*"
- LeMay: "**If you lose in Cuba you're going to get more and more pressure right on Berlin. I'm sure of that.**"

The Joint Chiefs Confront Kennedy on Oct. 19th (5 of 5)

- **Taylor:** “...we can never talk about invading again, after we get these missiles [operational], because they’ve got these pointed at our head...Seven days after the airstrike you could start the invasion going on for about 11 days...”
- **JFK:** “...we’d still have seven days to decide whether we want to go in.”
- **Taylor:** “We have flexibility...”
- **Wheeler:** “Mr. President, going back to the relationships between Cuba and Berlin...*there is no acceptable military solution to the Berlin problem, whereas there is in Cuba...*”
- **JFK:** “I appreciate your views...The argument for the blockade was that what we wanted to do is avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation or imbalance.”

[President Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara leave the room.]

- **Shoup:** “Well, what do you guys [think]? You really pulled the rug right out from under him.”
- **LeMay:** “**Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?**”
- **Shoup:** “...I just agree with you a hundred per cent. I agree with you three hundred per cent. That’s the only Goddamn...He finally got around to the word escalation. I heard him say escalation...It’s been there in Laos, it’s been in every Goddamn one [of these crises]. **When he says escalation, that’s it.** If somebody could keep them from doing the thing piecemeal. That’s our problem. You go in there and [start] friggin’ around with the missiles. You’re screwed. You go in there and frig around with anything else you’re screwed.
- **LeMay:** “**That’s right.**”
- **Shoup:** “***You’re screwed, screwed, screwed***...Goddamn it, if he wants to do it, you can’t fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can’t fiddle around with hitting the missile sites and then the SAM sites. You’ve got to go in and take out the Goddamn thing that’s going to stop you from doing your job.”
- **Wheeler:** “**He gave his speech about Berlin, and---**”
- **LeMay:** “**He equates the two.**”

General LeMay Introduces USAF U-2 Pilots to President Kennedy on October 30, 1962



JFK Addressed the Nation on October 22nd and
Signed the Quarantine Order on October 23rd

A Sober JFK Addresses the Nation After
Quarreling with Key Members of
Congress



A “Resolute” JFK Signs the
Quarantine Order 24 Hours Later



JFK Displayed Sober Resolve, Determination, and
“Coolness Under Fire” in Equal Measures



**Behind the Scenes Views of JFK Prior to His Speech on October 22nd,
and Prior to Signing the Quarantine Proclamation on October 23rd**



The Imbalance of Terror:

The U.S. Ability to Hit the USSR with Nukes Was Far Superior to Their Ability to Damage the United States in a Nuclear Exchange in 1962

[Recommended: *DEFCON-2*, by Polmar and Gresham]

	<u>United States</u>	<u>USSR</u>
ICBMs (Nuke Warheads)	142 Atlas 62 Titan	6 R-7s 20 R-16s
IRBMs and MRBMs (Nukes)	30 Jupiter (Italy) 1 Jupiter (Turkey) (only 1 of 15 operational)	36 R-12s [in Cuba]
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (Nukes)	32 Polaris SLBMs (in two submarines)	NONE
Bombers (Long-range, w/Nukes)	639 B-52 880 B-47 76 B-58	<u>About 100</u> (total) "Bear" and "Bison" long-range bombers
Other Bombers (w/Nukes)	<u>220</u> on 5 aircraft carriers in Western Pacific and Med.	<u>only 6 IL-28s with nukes</u> [in Cuba]

The “Quarantine” (Blockade) Began on **October 24, 1962...**
...and Continued Through **November 20, 1962**





The *Poltava*, loaded with 7 of the 24 IRBMs bound for Cuba, turned tail and headed for home, along with the other ships carrying the IRBMs and their support equipment, on October 23rd---after JFK's speech the night before.

Although all 24 nuclear warheads for the IRBMs made it to Cuba, without missiles to launch them they were useless. All 24 IRBM warheads were kept in the hold of the Soviet ship *Aleksandrovska*, at the port of La Isabela. On October 16, 1962 the CIA's DDCI (Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter) recommended to the NSC's SGA that Alpha-66 launch a commando raid, and sink a Soviet ship in that port.



Secretary of Defense McNamara and CNO George Anderson

Severely Clashed Over the Navy's Rules of Engagement During the Blockade

The result: Anderson was fired by JFK (forced into early retirement in 1963 by McNamara)---his "consolation prize" was being appointed Ambassador to Portugal by JFK.



Official U.S. Navy photograph dated July 3, 1961

ADM George W. Anderson, Jr., USN

On October 26, 1962 a Token Stop of a Harmless Soviet Charter (with no prohibited cargo onboard) named Marcula Was Made by U.S. Navy Destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. To Demonstrate That the Blockade Had "Teeth"



USAF General Tommy Power, Commander of SAC, Placed All of the Strategic Air Command at **DEFCON-2** on Wednesday, October 24th, the Same Day the “Quarantine” Was Put Into Place

- Power did this by transmitting an unusual voice radio broadcast to all SAC aircraft, “in the clear,” and by following up with an unencrypted military cable to all of SAC, which was normal procedure. (Both were intercepted by the Soviet Union, as Power intended).
- Power did so without seeking Presidential permission; he claimed he did not need Presidential permission and Curtis LeMay backed him up on that score.
- It was a very dangerous signal of **ESCALATION** that might have caused World War III to begin, and was an unparalleled and reckless act of insubordination, regardless of the technicalities involved.
- The number of SAC bombers on alert changed as follows as a result of his actions:
 - At **DEFCON-5** (during peacetime conditions) the normal number of B-52 bombers continuously airborne and on patrol with weapons onboard was **twelve (12)**.
 - On Monday night, October 22nd, when JFK placed the military at **DEFCON-3**, an additional 54 bombers had joined the 12 that were already on continuous, 24-hour airborne alert, for a new total of sixty-six (66) B-52 heavy bombers airborne, and circling, near the borders of the USSR.
 - On Wednesday, October 24th, when Power boosted SAC to **DEFCON-2**, ABC news claimed (in 1992) that the number of nuclear-capable bombers on alert shifted to **1,500 overall, with 200 now on continuous airborne alert** (loaded with nuclear weapons); and **145 ICBMs** were on high alert. [In his masterful book *Eyeball to Eyeball*, CIA photoanalyst Dino Brugioni claimed very similar numbers: 1,436 bombers were now on alert, and 134 ICBMs had been placed on high alert. Per author Michael Dobbs, by November 4th, SAC had 1,479 bombers; 1,003 airborne refueling tankers; and 182 ballistic missiles on alert.]

Historian Richard Rhodes wrote in *Dark Sun* that according to a retired SAC wing commander, at the height of the Missile Crisis, **SAC airborne alert bombers deliberately flew past their normal turnaround points near the USSR and continued flying toward Soviet airspace until Soviet freighters carrying crucial equipment to Cuba stopped dead in the Atlantic.** Soviet radar operators would definitely have noticed the highly unusual and provocative activity of SAC bombers flying past their turnaround points. **“I knew what my target was,” the former SAC general intoned: “Leningrad.”**

“This Is General Power Speaking... We Are In An Advanced State of Readiness...”

During the mid-1950s, when LeMay and Power were both at SAC, they apparently **tried to provoke the USSR into a fatal response** with belligerent and provocative overflights of Soviet territory. (Many U.S. pilots were shot down, as a result, and many barely escaped with their lives; some ended up prisoners for years.)

Both LeMay and Power used to joke with their pilots, “If we run this mission properly, maybe we can start World War III.”

This may have been what the freewheeling Tommy Power (whom LeMay later called a “sadist”) was attempting on October 24, 1962 when he placed all of SAC at DEFCON-2, and then publicly announced it.



The Fog of War:

Things We Didn't Know During the Missile Crisis

- The Soviet Nuclear Order of Battle:
 - **Thirty Six (36) R-12 MRBMs** and twenty-four (24) mobile launchers were in Cuba [the United States was never quite sure of the precise total numbers of MRBMs].
 - **Each R-12 MRBM had a ONE-MEGATON warhead (total: 36).**
 - Additionally, **although the twenty-four (24) R-14 IRBM missiles turned around at sea and were never offloaded, all 24 of their ONE-MEGATON nuclear warheads** arrived in Cuba onboard the *Aleksandrovsk*, but remained onboard the vessel.
 - **Six (6) TWELVE (12) KILOTON atomic bombs** were landed for use with 6 of the 56 IL-28 medium jet bombers.
 - **Totally unknown to the United States, the USSR had placed TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS of two types in Cuba, to defend against an invasion:**
 - **TWELVE (12) short-range** (about 18 miles) **“LUNA” rockets** (and six launcher/transporters), each with a **TWO (2) KILOTON nuclear warhead**, for use against invasion beaches.
 - **EIGHTY (80) “FKR” pilotless cruise missiles** (and 16 mobile launchers), each with a **FOURTEEN (14) KILOTON nuclear warhead**, and a range of at least 50-60 miles.

The Fog of War: Things We Didn't Know During the Missile Crisis (Conclusion)

- The CIA never definitely ascertained that there were ANY nuclear warheads in Cuba.
- The United States never knew that there were 92 TACTICAL NUKES in Cuba that could have slaughtered any U.S. invasion force, even if only used in part.
- American analysts UNDERESTIMATED the range of both the MRBMs and IRBMs **by about 20%**.
- The Soviet Commander in Cuba was given oral permission by Khrushchev in July of 1962 to **use the TACTICAL NUKES** to repel a U.S. invasion if there were no longer communications with Moscow. A draft military telegram confirming that order on September 8th was never released, but Khrushchev's permission to use the tactical nukes was orally reconfirmed by the Defense Minister in October. Although that permission was rescinded TWICE (on October 22nd and 27th), **Soviet Generals Gribkov and Titov** (who were both present in Cuba) **subsequently stated that it would have been a "use or lose" situation in the event of an invasion, and both expressed the opinion that some of the tactical nukes WOULD HAVE BEEN USED ANYWAY.**
- The U.S. greatly underestimated the numbers of Soviet troops in Cuba; **about 42,000 of the planned-for 45,000 were actually present**. In September, the U.S. estimate was only 5,000; on October 22nd our estimate had risen to only 10,000; and by October 24th the U.S. estimate had risen to 22,000 (still 20,000 short of the true number).
- **Even if U.S. troops had NOT been annihilated by nuclear fire, of the total U.S. forces of 180,000 men available, only about 90,000 would have landed on D-day; they would have been opposed by four Soviet motorized rifle regiments (i.e., 10,000 combat troops with about 124 tanks and sophisticated weapons); by a Cuban Army of 75,000 men; and a Cuban militia of about 100,000 men. The U.S. invasion force would have encountered severe challenges, possibly leading to nuclear escalation by the United States. Nuclear retaliation by American forces would have been a certainty if ANY of the Soviet tactical nukes had been employed.**
- **CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison, requested U.S. tactical nukes (named "Honest John") be added to the invasion force** when he found out about the LUNAs after they were briefed to JFK on Friday, October 26th, **but SECDEF Robert 95 McNamara forbade their deployment.**

President Kennedy
Clashed with LeMay
Again As Soon as the
Missile Crisis Was Over

JFK: “Gentlemen, we’ve won. I don’t want you to ever say it, *but you know we’ve won, and I know we’ve won.*”

Admiral Anderson: “**We’ve been had!**”

General LeMay: “**Won, hell! We lost! We should go in and wipe them out today! This is the greatest defeat in our history---Mr. President, we should invade today!**”



1962 Retrospective:

From Mutual Distrust, to Mutual Contempt

- THE WORLD IS FORTUNATE that John F. Kennedy was President in October of 1962:
 - His decision not to invade Cuba saved the world from nuclear conflagration;
 - Such a total nuclear war would have resulted---we know now---in “nuclear winter,” and would have destroyed world agriculture, and civilization, not to mention hundreds of millions (and more likely, billions) of lives.
- The U.S. military leadership never forgave JFK for not bombing and invading Cuba; they remained bitter in the extreme. Remember, Curtis LeMay called it “**the greatest defeat in our history,**” and said to JFK afterwards: “**Won, hell---WE LOST!**”
- *From their point of view,* if JFK had bailed out the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, and overthrown Castro with U.S. military power, there would have been **NO MISSILES IN CUBA.**
- Remember, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted he invade Cuba in March of 1962 (“Northwoods”), and again in April of 1962 (with the “stink bomb” memo), and JFK refused each time. *If he had done so, they surely reasoned, there would have been* **NO MISSILES IN CUBA.**
- I am personally convinced that the military animus for John F. Kennedy was so great that the assassination plot against him was born immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis. **MUTUAL SKEPTICISM MORPHED INTO MUTUAL DISTRUST DURING 1961; AND IN 1962, HAD BECOME MUTUAL CONTEMPT.** I agree with John Newman that while critical elements of the CIA were surely “handmaidens” in JFK’s assassination, the “Galactic Center” of the assassination plot was in the Pentagon.

1963: ENDGAME (Cuba) (1 of 3)

[Recommended: *Inside the ARRB*, (Vol. 5), pgs. 1535-1547, by Douglas Horne]

- **JFK and the hardline members of the National Security Establishment continued to grow ever-further apart throughout 1963**, as this series of slides demonstrates:
- **“Mongoose” became moribund on October 26, 1962** when its activities were suspended, and at the end of October 1962 ExComm ordered cancellation of *all sabotage or militant operations* during negotiations with the Soviets over the details of withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba. Early in 1963 National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy declared, “...there is well-nigh universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end.” **Meanwhile, Cuba planning in the Pentagon lurched into territory previously forbidden by President Kennedy:**
 - **As JFK’s *ad hoc* committee (the ICCCA) struggled to define a new Cuba policy throughout most of the year**, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon---**Maxwell Taylor**, who had assumed his post on **October 1, 1962** just prior to the Missile Crisis---blithely proceeded to “do his own thing” with regard to Cuba, without waiting for the bureaucratic machinery to crank out a new policy. **In a striking display of insubordination, Maxwell Taylor---in the Spring of 1963---proceeded to secretly plan for:**
 - **“Northwoods” style *engineered pretexts to invade Cuba*** (in spite of JFK’s failure to endorse “Northwoods” in March of 1962, and the President’s refusal to invade Cuba in either April or October of that year); and
 - **With Taylor’s encouragement, CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison, who would have been in charge of the invasion during the Missile Crisis) developed OPLAN 380-63, a detailed contingency plan (with dates attached) for commencing a full package of massive air strikes against Cuba on July 26, 1964 (Cuban Independence Day), to be followed by a U.S. invasion about August 3, 1964---with the overthrow of Castro’s government and the defeat of Cuba optimistically planned for by October 1, 1964 (just in time for the U.S. presidential election). [This outrageous plan was finally withdrawn from consideration on October 4, 1963---when Vietnam was the new star on the horizon.]**

1963: ENDGAME (Vietnam) (2 of 3)

[Recommended: *JFK and Vietnam, Second Edition*, by Dr. John Newman]

- **Meanwhile, JFK found himself at increasing odds with the Pentagon and civilian “hawks” in the State Department over Vietnam policy:**
 - **By March of 1963**, JFK and McNamara had figured out that all of the optimistic reporting on Vietnam by MACV throughout 1962 (called “the optimistic interlude” by John Newman) **had been lies**;
 - **Meanwhile, back in April of 1962**, JFK ally Ambassador J.K. Galbraith had begun to seriously question why the U.S. was in Vietnam at all. That month, JFK urged his staff to **“be prepared to seize upon any favorable moment to reduce our commitment”** to South Vietnam. **The following month, on May 8, 1962**, McNamara had directed **General Paul Harkins (MACV)** to **“devise a plan for turning full responsibility [for the war] over to South Vietnam and reducing the size of our military command.”**
 - On **April 18, 1963** **Robert McNamara** made his first mention of a 1,000 man American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.
 - On **May 6, 1963** at the **Eighth SECDEF Conference on Vietnam**, McNamara ordered **“concrete plans”** for a **1,000 man withdrawal** of U.S. advisors **by the end of the year**, and told Harkins his withdrawal plans as presented to McNamara at the conference **were too slow**, and needed to be accelerated, so as to have **all U.S. troops out by the end of 1965**.
 - **JFK engineered a contentious trip to Vietnam by McNamara and Taylor in September 1963**, and got them to recommend on October 2nd---with considerable arm-twisting---to formally recommend the 1,000 man withdrawal by the end of 1963, and a full pullout by the end of 1965, predicated to the public (in a jujitsu move) upon *the fiction of battlefield success* which had begun in the spring of 1962.
 - On **October 11, 1963**, JFK (who knew there was no battlefield success) issued **TOP SECRET NSAM 263**, which **ordered implementation** of the recommendations in the **McNamara-Taylor Report** to withdraw 1,000 U.S. advisors (out of the total of 16,000) by the end of the year, and to complete the U.S. withdrawal of its advisory forces by the end of 1965.
 - **At the next SECDEF conference on November 20, 1963**, **McNamara** was told the truth about how bad the war and the U.S. advisory effort was going, **for the first time, TWO DAYS PRIOR TO JFK’S ASSASSINATION**.
 - **The clear implication here is that those briefing McNamara (i.e., Maxwell Taylor) knew that President Kennedy would not survive his trip to Dallas**, and were preparing McNamara for the ensuing escalation of the U.S. Vietnam effort into a combat role following JFK’s death.


President Kennedy Meets with **JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor** and **Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara** on October 2, 1963: **JFK Ensured** That Their Report Following Their Trip to South Vietnam Recommended a 1,000 Man Withdrawal of U.S. Forces by the End of '63, and a Complete Pullout by the End of 1965.



Maxwell Taylor (who secretly gutted the Vietnam 1,000 man withdrawal plan in the Fall, and hid OPLAN 34-63 from JFK) Was Still Generating Plans to Invade Cuba, Based on Engineered Pretexts, in the Spring of 1963

His performance on both counts during 1963 was a disgraceful example of insubordination and Machiavellian plotting, worthy of Shakespeare's character Iago, in *Othello*.

Pentagon "hawk" Paul Nitze supported Taylor's continued call for pretexts to invade Cuba during the Spring of 1963. Nitze had also supported conducting a nuclear first strike on the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis.



1963: ENDGAME (Ending the Cold War) (3 of 3)

[Recommended: *To Move the World: JFK's Quest for Peace*, by Jeffrey Sachs; *Two Days in June*, by Andrew Cohen; and *JFK and the Unspeakable*, by Jim Douglass]

- JFK's PEACE SPEECH, the commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, was a watershed in Cold War relations. In it, he:
 - Proposed that Americans *re-evaluate their attitudes toward the Soviet Union*;
 - Proposed ending the Cold War---*instead of winning it*; and
 - Proposed a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union *after announcing a self-imposed moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing*.
- The Limited Test Ban Treaty was initialed in Moscow on July 25, 1963; JFK gave a major speech in support of it on July 26, 1963; it was signed by Great Britain, the USSR, and the U.S. on August 5, 1963; and JFK moved it skillfully through Senate ratification on September 24, 1963, with an 80-19 vote in favor. President Kennedy signed the instruments of ratification in a major signing ceremony on October 7, 1963. The Joint Chiefs hated the treaty, but JFK had outmaneuvered them.
- On September 12, 1963, President Kennedy received another nuclear war briefing from the "Net Evaluation Subcommittee," recommending a possible first strike on the USSR in 1968, in which Soviet casualties would be at least 140 million people. This time, instead of walking out of the meeting as he had in 1961, JFK went toe-to-toe with the briefer, concluding: "*Preemption is not possible for us... This argues in favor of a conventional force [rather than nuclear weapons]*."
- On September 20, 1963, at the United Nations, JFK proposed ending the space race with the Soviet Union, and instead, going to the Moon together, as a cooperative goal. On November 12, 1963, JFK personally signed NSAM 271, directing NASA head James Webb to take the lead on broader cooperation with the USSR in outer space, including lunar landing programs---and ordering an interim report by December 15, 1963. JFK was willing to abandon the Space Race---his most popular program by far---to facilitate détente with the Soviet Union, and considered doing so to be in the interests of national security.
- In September of 1963, JFK angered the CIA (and no doubt the Cold Warriors in the Pentagon) by beginning an effort toward a rapprochement with Castro through indirect approaches by William Attwood (a long-trusted friend of JFK's from prep school at Choate) and Lisa Howard of ABC news. This was furthered by an interview JFK gave to French journalist Jean Daniel---who was knowingly being used as an indirect emissary to Castro---in which the President made clear that as long as Castro eliminated his military ties with the Soviet Union, anything was possible; JFK reiterated that position in a speech in Miami on November 18, 1963. U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and Averell Harriman at State, both supported this rapprochement.
- WHILE NONE OF THESE ACTIONS BY THEMSELVES---NEITHER THE PEACE SPEECH, ATTEMPTS TO END THE SPACE RACE, NOR THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CASTRO---WAS THE GENESIS OF THE ASSASSINATION PLOT, I VIEW THEM AS "THE FINAL NAILS IN JFK'S COFFIN," proof to the conspirators that "JFK really had to go."

Cuba Policy Is “Reformulated” In 1963:

The Same Old Solution Is Dressed Up in New Clothing

[Recommended: *Inside the ARRB*, (Vol. 5), pgs. 1535-1547, by Douglas Horne]

- JFK’s new *ad hoc* Cuba Policy Committee, the ICCCA, began meeting in January of 1963, and was chaired by Sterling Cottrell of State, who was not a “hawk;” Cottrell still wanted to overthrow the Castro regime, but **DID NOT** favor a U.S. invasion of Cuba in the absence of aggression that threatened the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. State favored the same, tired old methods that had not worked previously with Mongoose, namely: diplomatic, economic, psychological, and covert actions.
- The ICCCA met all year long and churned out numerous drafts; its final policy document on Cuba was not formalized until December 30, 1963; was prepared jointly by State, Defense, and the CIA; and was titled: “Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.” By this time it was clear that the Pentagon had been victorious in the long battles in committee with the State Department, and had managed to mold a policy document that hypocritically denied up-front that the U.S. contemplated either “a premeditated full-scale invasion of Cuba,” or “the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action,” thus lending a fig-leaf of support to JFK’s no-invasion pledge that helped end the **Missile Crisis**. **HOWEVER**, where the rubber met the road, the policy document went on to say that **once a coup** (which would be a military coup sponsored by the U.S.) **began**, a “Special Team” from the U.S. would be inserted into Cuba to evaluate its chances of success. Meanwhile the U.S. would reestablish its blockade of Cuba, and would prepare to activate OPLANs 312 and 316 (the same air strike and invasion plans considered during the Missile Crisis). The U.S. “Special Team” was to coordinate with coup leaders, and get them to publicly proclaim a provisional government, and ask for U.S. and OAS assistance, *after which the U.S. President would be required to approve activation of OPLANs 312 or 316, which would launch a full-scale invasion of Cuba.*
- **AFTER ONE YEAR OF DELIBERATIONS, all the ICCCA had done was to “put lipstick on a pig.”**


**The PEACE SPEECH:
The June 10, 1963 Commencement Address
at American University**



The Peace Speech (1 of 4)

[Recommended: *To Move the World: JFK's Quest for Peace*, by Jeffrey Sachs; *Two Days in June*, by Andrew Cohen; and *JFK and the Unspeakable*, by Jim Douglass]

- **Jeffrey Sachs has written:** “The Cuban Missile Crisis was the catharsis and turning point. From then until the end of his life a year later, Kennedy led. He became a master of events, not their pawn. He envisaged a pathway to peace, and achieved it. He was a changed man, and he changed the world...He was both idealist and realist, visionary and arm-twisting politician.”
- **ORIGINS OF THE SPEECH:**
 - Its primary drafter was Ted Sorensen (JFK's alter-ego), with help from McGeorge Bundy, Karl Kaysen, and William Foster; circulation was closely held.
 - **McNamara and Rusk saw it with less than one week to go** before its delivery;
 - **JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg were only shown sections of the speech dealing with the proposed nuclear test ban treaty, with only a few days to go.**
 - Maxwell Taylor told Karl Kaysen that *it would not be a good idea to show any parts of the speech to the other Chiefs*, because their comments would be predictable, and nothing good would come of that.
- **JFK was about to deliver a “hammer blow” to the Cold War paradigm, in an overt attempt to end the Cold War. He was doing all he could to avoid telegraphing his intentions to his many opponents in the national security establishment.**
 - His strategy was to get the public to recognize and understand that **“there was humanity, decency, and valor on both sides of the Cold War divide,”** as Jeffrey Sachs expressed it. If he could do that, it would make a test ban treaty acceptable to the public, and would help reduce tensions between the superpowers.
- **AS THE SPEECH BEGAN KENNEDY WENT AFTER CURTIS LEMAY:**
 - LeMay was fond of discussing how Roman military might had produced “Pax Romana;” how the superlative and lethal British Navy in the 18th and 19th centuries had produced “Pax Britannica;” **and, with stunning hubris, how his nuclear bombers had achieved “Pax Atomica.”** Once, during a lecture, LeMay had actually morphed **“Pax Atomica”** into **“Pax Americana.”**
 - JFK began his speech by countering Curtis LeMay's bellicose claim that SAC, his nuclear bomber force, had created a **“Pax Americana”** based on ¹⁰⁵ military might alone (see next slide).




The Peace Speech (2 of 4)

- JFK's definition of real peace, he made clear, did not include the kind of "Pax Americana" LeMay had been boasting about:
 - "I have...chosen this time and this place to discuss...the most important topic on earth: world peace. **What kind of a peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? *Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war*...** I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children---*not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women...*"
- JFK next explained **why** he was talking about peace:
 - "**I speak of peace because of the new face of war.** Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn..."
- Kennedy next discussed public attitudes about peace in 1963:
 - "I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men...Let us reexamine our attitude toward peace itself. **Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable---that mankind is doomed---that we are gripped by forces beyond our control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade---therefore, they can be resolved by man.** And man can be as big as he wants...**Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable...**"



The Peace Speech (3 of 4)

- Next came the most challenging part of the speech---his attempt to get Americans to stop demonizing the Soviets, which was essential if he were to begin to end the Cold War:
 - “Let us reexamine our attitudes toward the Soviet Union...**No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue...**we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements---in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and acts of courage.
 - “Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. *And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least twenty million lost their lives...A third of the nation’s territory, including two thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland---a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.”*
 - “Today, should war ever break out again---no matter how---our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours...In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race...**And if we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.** **FOR IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, OUR MOST BASIC COMMON LINK IS THAT WE ALL INHABIT THIS SMALL PLANET. WE ALL CHERISH OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURES. AND WE ARE ALL MORTAL.”**



The Peace Speech, and Immediate Aftermath (4 of 4)

- **KHRUSHCHEV WAS STUNNED.** He declared it the greatest American speech since the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. **The Soviet government stopped jamming the Voice of America broadcasts to allow the Peace Speech to be played in full on the air.** The Soviet government also printed the entire text, uncensored, in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.
- JFK and Khrushchev had been privately discussing ways to make a nuclear test ban treaty achievable, following the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis in late November.
 - JFK announced in the speech that the United States and Great Britain were sending diplomats to the USSR to commence negotiations to consummate a test ban treaty with the Soviets, something that had been an elusive goal since the late 1950s under Eisenhower.
 - The negotiations commenced July 15, 1963 in Moscow, with Khrushchev in attendance.
 - **Kennedy also announced that beginning immediately, the U.S. was announcing a complete moratorium on its own nuclear testing, providing other states did the same;** the U.S. had commenced nuclear testing again during April of 1962, after the Soviets had resumed testing in the fall of 1961, during the Berlin Crisis.
- **The Chief U.S. negotiator was Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman,** who had been an experienced diplomat during WW II under Franklin Roosevelt; he was trusted by the Soviets because he had been co-chair of the Beaverbrook-Harriman Supply Mission to Moscow in September 1941 to discuss urgent Lend-Lease assistance; and had served as U.S. Ambassador to the USSR from October 1943 through January 1946.
- *JFK remained involved in the negotiations on a daily basis until the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was initialed on July 25, 1963.* **President Kennedy viewed the treaty as a way to slow nuclear proliferation around the world, and as a foot-in-the-door, a first step, toward future arms control agreements.** *This achievement was so important to him that he made a major address on national television the next day.* 111

Looking Fatigued and Haunted, JFK Spoke to the Nation on July 26, 1963 About Reaching An Agreement With the USSR on a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

“I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope...Yesterday, a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water...it is a victory for mankind...This treaty is not the millennium... but it is an important first step---a step toward peace---a step toward reason---a step away from war.”



This Is Why JFK Was So Concerned:


**The Continued Testing and Stockpiling of Immensely Destructive Hydrogen Bombs
Threatened the Future of Human Existence**






AtomCentral.com







**Between 1945-1962, The United States Conducted
331 Atmospheric Nuclear Tests**



The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water”

- **JFK’s ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON JULY 26, 1963 WAS PROFOUNDLY MOVING THEN, AND REMAINS SO TODAY.** Excerpts follow:
 - “I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. *Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth.* In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, **the world of Communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious cycle of conflicting ideology and interest.** Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension...”
 - “**Yesterday, a shaft of light cut into the darkness.** Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control...the treaty initialed yesterday...is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we can police...It will prohibit...the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers the world a welcome sign of hope...but the achievement of this goal is not a victory of one side---it is a victory for mankind...This treaty is not the millennium...but it is an important first step---a step toward peace---a step toward reason---a step away from war.”

President Kennedy then spoke of four broad areas of benefit from the treaty: (1) reducing world tension and making possible broader areas of agreement; (2) freeing the world from the fears and dangers of nuclear fallout; (3) it might slow nuclear proliferation; and (4) it could limit the nuclear arms race.

The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (conclusion)

- JFK WOUND UP HIS SPEECH WITH TWO MEMORABLE PASSAGES:
 - “A full scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than sixty minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. **And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, ‘the survivors would envy the dead.’ For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors.** So let us try to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world’s slide toward final annihilation.”
 - “**If only one thermonuclear bomb** were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy...**that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War.**”
- **NO WONDER JFK LOOKED SO WORRIED:** *Four of his own advisors---Paul Nitze, Roswell Gilpatric, General Tommy Power, and General Curtis LeMay---had all reputedly wanted to “first strike” the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis.* These men were “sacred cows” in the American national security establishment. They “didn’t get it”---they either viewed nukes as just a bigger and better way to do strategic bombing, or they had so demonized and dehumanized the “enemy” in their own minds, that in a time of stress they didn’t care that they had adopted a truly genocidal mentality.
- **POLL NUMBERS** were favorable after his speech: 53% gave the treaty “unqualified approval;” 29% “qualified approval;” and 17% were opposed. JFK ally Norman Cousins (the editor of *Saturday Review*) launched a nationwide campaign promoting passage of the treaty which was very successful.
- JFK had Robert McNamara and Roswell Gilpatric spend many days persuading the reluctant service Chiefs that the treaty would **freeze our superiority in place**; and after bludgeoning them into submission, **only JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was allowed to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.** **Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee took up the treaty first, BEFORE the less friendly Senate Armed Services Committee.**
- JFK had changed the climate in America from one of fear to one of hope; **when right-wing opponents like Edward Teller and Lewis Strauss testified against the treaty, they had already lost the battle.**
- **THE SENATE RATIFIED THE TREATY (80-19) ON SEPTEMBER 24TH, AND JFK SIGNED THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION ON OCTOBER 7, 1963. IT WAS HIS PROUDEST ACHIEVEMENT.**

President John F. Kennedy Proudly Signs the Instruments of Ratification for the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on October 7, 1963



John F. Kennedy's Journey, From 1961-1963

- John F. Kennedy entered the Presidency as a **SKEPTIC** about the national security establishment; **by the end of 1961, mutual distrust** defined his relationship with most of the Cold War policy makers, after his decisions not to go to war in **Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam**.
- **By the end of 1962**, his enemies in the national security establishment viewed him as a **HERETIC**, following his resolution of the **Cuban Missile Crisis** by diplomacy, instead of war. His relationship with most of these “sacred cows” throughout most of 1962 could be defined as one of **mutual contempt**.
- **In 1963**, after he gave the **Peace Speech**, ensured the successful ratification of the **Limited Test Ban Treaty**, and ordered the **withdrawal from Vietnam**, his enemies inside the national security state viewed him as an **APOSTATE**.
- He was a true **PROFILE IN COURAGE** for not going to war on numerous occasions, *even though the majority of his own national security establishment pressured him relentlessly to do so. For JFK, war was the option of last resort; for many of his advisors, engaged in their “holy war” against Communism, war was the preferred option, the option of FIRST RESORT.*
- *He paid for his repeated opposition to them in Dallas, Texas ---with his life.*



November 22, 1963


The “**Unspeakable**”
Rears Its Ugly Head
In Dallas, Texas---
*---After Two Other
Assassination Plots
Failed, In Chicago
and Miami, Earlier
That Month.*





















Journey's End






























The Bullets in Dallas Left Us With A Void That We Still Feel Today...



...A Void That Only Grows With the Passage of Time



Some Would Say that the **United States Government** Has Been a **Riderless Horse** Since November of 1963




“Seven Days in May:”
The Metaphor That Just Won’t Go Away

The Film’s Release Was Scheduled for Late November 1963, But Was Postponed Due to its Disturbing Content

**President Kennedy Read the Book
In the Summer of 1962...**

**...and Asked His Hollywood Friend, Director John
Frankenheimer, to Make the Movie As
“A Warning to the Nation”**



JFK Commented on the 1962 National Security Bestseller *Seven Days in May* to His Friend, Paul Fay, the Under Secretary of the Navy

- In his 1966 book *The Pleasure of His Company*, Paul “Red” Fay quoted JFK’s comments about the explosive novel (about an attempted military coup in the United States), after Jack Kennedy read the book in the summer of 1962, *prior to* the Cuban Missile Crisis:

“It’s possible, it could happen in this country, but the conditions would have to be just right. If, for example, the country had a young President, and he had a Bay of Pigs, there would be a certain uneasiness. Maybe the military would do a little criticizing behind his back, but this would be written off as the usual military dissatisfaction with civilian control. Then if there were another Bay of Pigs, the reaction of the country would be, ‘Is he too young and inexperienced?’ The military would almost feel it was their patriotic obligation to stand ready to preserve the integrity of the nation, and God only knows just what segment of democracy they would be defending if they overthrew the elected establishment...then, if there were a third Bay of Pigs, it could happen...*but it won’t happen on my watch.*”
- **BUT IT DID HAPPEN ON HIS WATCH.** Instead of a “military junta” taking over in a bloodless coup, *it was an assassination*---backstopped by an absurd cover-story based on a dead “patsy;” by planted evidence; by a fraudulent autopsy; and supported by a gullible and compliant national media who thought it was better that they support ‘the integrity of our national institutions,’ rather than raise uncomfortable questions about our society, and the national security state.

Former Senator Gary Hart Wrote this About JFK's Death:

"...IT WAS HIS SUCCESS [AS A REFORMER] THAT PROVED LIFE THREATENING."

"...for those seriously drawn to public service and social change, Kennedy's death suggested something deeper and more sinister. It suggested the presence of ominous dark forces just beneath society's veneer, forces that if goaded by the threat of institutional change, could rise up and strike down anything or anyone---including an increasingly popular President of the United States---who might threaten the *status quo*, traditional power structures, ancient political arrangements.

The first Kennedy assassination, soon to be punctuated and underscored by more assassinations, had about it a dark, mystical quality. It seemed a warning against straying too near the permissible boundaries of social change...He seemed too independent of established power structures and too capable of rearranging networks and agreements carefully arbitrated over time by powerful interests."



Jacqueline Kennedy
Spoke Eloquently to
Anastas Mikoyan, the
Deputy Premier of the
USSR, in the White
House Reception Line
Prior to JFK's Funeral
on November 25, 1963:

"Mr. Mikoyan, thank you for coming, and would you tell Mr. Khrushchev, for me, that my husband and Mr. Khrushchev could have brought peace to this world by working together. *Now, Mr. Khrushchev will have to do it alone.*"

---As recalled by the official Soviet interpreter, Viktor Sukhodrev, in 2003.



Ted Sorensen, JFK's Speechwriter, Said This About Why JFK Ran for the Presidency in 1960:

"I think that the principal reason Kennedy ran for the Presidency was he thought the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of massive retaliation and all of that was heading the country toward nuclear war. He felt the policy of massive retaliation---in which we supposedly kept the peace by saying if you step one foot over the line in West Berlin or somewhere else, we will respond by annihilating you with nuclear weapons---he felt that was mad. He also felt it was a policy that had no credibility and would [therefore] not prevent Soviet pressures or incursions in one place or another."



Robert McNamara Said This About President Kennedy in 2003:

“President Kennedy believed a primary responsibility of a President---indeed, THE primary responsibility of a President---is to keep the nation out of war, if at all possible.”

“He was not a perfect human being. *Who among us is?* He made mistakes in his private life and his public life. But---had he lived---the world would be a different world today, AND IT WOULD BE A VERY, VERY, MUCH BETTER WORLD.”



Some Days Were Good Days, Like **September 12, 1962** in Houston, Where JFK Gave an Inspirational Address on the Importance of the Space Program...





...and Previously, on **February 23, 1962**, When President Kennedy Awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal to Astronaut John Glenn After He Became the First American to Orbit the Earth...





...and **June 26, 1963** in West Berlin, Where
President Kennedy Celebrated NATO's Defense
of Western Access Rights to the City.







But Other Days Were Not So Good...They Were Characterized By:

- ...incessant pressure to commit American combat troops to invade Cuba, and to intervene militarily in Laos, and South Vietnam;
- ...deceit, and lies, designed to manipulate him to commit the U.S. military **in 1961** to bail out a doomed exile invasion of Cuba based upon a Big Lie; and a continuous stream of lies **in 1962** about the supposed “success” of the South Vietnamese war effort in its civil war with North Vietnam (*so that JFK would not withdraw the American advisors*);
- ...and by unrelenting suggestions to use nuclear weapons against various nations in the Communist Bloc (*in Laos in 1961, throughout the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and 1962, and against the Soviet Union in 1961, 1962, and 1963*).

Disrespect, Insubordination, and Contempt for President Kennedy
Characterized the Attitude of the Joint Chiefs in 1961 and 1962;
For Them War Was Always the “**First Option,**” But For President
Kennedy, It Was the “Option of Last Resort”

[By the end of 1962 JFK's fate was sealed, and the clock was ticking on his life.]



A Stern and Profoundly Unhappy JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer Is Relieved of His Duties by General Maxwell Taylor on October 1, 1962; President Kennedy Reassigned Him to Head NATO's Military Forces in Europe as SACEUR. *Receiving a Medal from the President, His Nemesis, Did Not Assuage the Injury Lemnitzer Felt After Nearly Two Years of Conflict.*




The Distrust and Dislike Between Kennedy and Lemnitzer Is Evident in This Photograph Taken on October 1, 1962; Lemnitzer Was Profoundly Bitter.
[Note the Satisfied General Maxwell Taylor in the Background, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric at Right.]



***“Treason Doth Never Prosper, What’s the Reason?
For If It Prosper, NONE DARE CALL IT TREASON”***

---Englishman John Harington (1561-1612)



Some JFK-JCS Relationships Were More Difficult Than Others
...And Only Worsened with the Passage of Time






“One May Smile, and Smile, and Be a Villain”

---William Shakespeare, Hamlet

[The Possible Roles of These Two Individuals in the Coup Are Worthy of Further Study.]



CIA Director Allen Dulles...

...found himself seriously at odds with JFK, after lying to him about the Bay of Pigs and “setting him up,” in an effort to force Kennedy to approve military intervention to bail out the exile invasion...as a result, he got fired by President Kennedy in November of 1961.



An Embittered Allen Dulles Said After Kennedy's Death:
"That Little Kennedy...He Thought He Was a God."



**The CIA's Head of Counterintelligence, James Angleton (left),
and Covert Operator William Harvey (right),
Both Had Important Roles in the
Joint Military-CIA *Coup d'Etat***



Standing Against Their Encouragement of **Clandestine,**
Conventional, and Nuclear Warfare Across the Globe Was the Sober
Voice of Reason, a Dedicated Humanist *Who Placed Human Welfare*
Above Ideology





Lest We Forget





A Personal “Thank You” Is In Order

To Those Who Have Inspired Me On My Journey of Discovery:

David Mantik, Gaeton Fonzi, Jeremy Gunn, John Newman, Jacob Hornberger,
Sydney Wilkinson, Thom Whitehead, Peter Janney, Dino Brugioni, Beverly Sadowski,
and John F. Kennedy, Who Inspired Me to Serve in the United States Navy,
to Honor Public Service, and to value Truth above all things.

